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The paper studies the relationship between social capital (SC) and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) by investigating the idea of a virtuous circle between the level of SC and the implementation of 
CSR standard of behaviour that favours the creation of cooperative networks between the firm and all its 
stakeholders by promoting the spread of social norms of trust and cooperation. 
Multidimensionality  of  social  capital    (Uphoff  1999,  Paldam  2000)  is    accounted    in  terms  of 
cognitive  and  structural  SC.  The  first  refers  to  dispositional  characters  of  agents  that  affect  their 
propensity to behave in conformity with social norms, whereas the latter consists  of social networks 
connecting agents. With regard to the concept of CSR, we adopt a contractarian approach and consider 
CSR as an extended model of corporate governance, based on fiduciary duties owed to all the firm's 
stakeholders. Among stakeholders, we distinguish between strong and weak stakeholders. Both of them 
are locked into a relation with the firm by specific investments. While, however, cooperation with strong 
stakeholders  is  a  long  run  equilibrium  for  the  firm,  on  the  contrary,  in  the  relations  with  weak 
stakeholders the firm face material incentives to defect from cooperation with them. 
By joint use of the tools of network analysis and psychological game theory, the paper shows the role 
of cognitive SC and CSR in promoting the emergence of cooperative networks between the firm and all 
its stakeholders (structural SC). In particular, (a) the level of cognitive SC, in terms of community or 
society-wide disposition to comply with fair social norms, plays a key role in providing opportunities for 
the firm to agree (with strong stakeholders) on CSR principles and hence to induce incentives to comply 
with them. (b) The explicit agreement on CSR principles and norms engenders cognitive social capital on 
its own. It does so by creating room for conformist preferences that exploit beliefs of mutual conformity 
and  dispositions  to  conform.  Moreover,  the  agreement  on  CSR  principles  by  itself  positively  affects 
beliefs about reciprocal conformity on the part of the firm and its strong stakeholders. (c) The level of 
cognitive social capital (both beliefs and dispositions) and the decision to adopt CSR principles generate 
structural  social  capital  understood  as  long-term  cooperative  relationships  between  the  firm  and  its 
stakeholders, even though, on considering the material payoffs characterizing the single relationships, the 
firm would have no incentive to cooperate with weak stakeholders. Alongside the notion of sub game 
prefect equilibria and credible threats, we show that strong stakeholders endowed with high cognitive 
social capital, have an incentive in punishing the firm if it is not cooperative with weak stakeholders. The 
sanction may induce the firm to cooperate with weak stakeholders as well, and it generates cooperative 
networks that would not be sustainable without the power of the sanction.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1.  Subject and aim 
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to trust, trustworthiness and social 
norms of reciprocity and cooperation as key factors in socio-economic development. 
Even  though  from  different  perspectives,  both  the  concept  of  social  capital  and  the 
notion of corporate social responsibility refer to these elements.  
Since the seminal work by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) focusing on the 
effects of social capital (hereafter also SC) on economic and government performance, 
the concept of SC has been widely used to analyse how interpersonal relations affect 
economic activity by favouring cooperation. Many definitions of social capital have 
been proposed, and two principal approaches to this concept may be identified. On the 
one hand, social capital is defined in terms of generalised trust, civic norms, beliefs and 
dispositions which affect the propensity to cooperate (e.g. Putnam et al., 1993; Knack 
and Keefer, 1997). On the other hand, social capital is defined in terms of cooperative 
networks among agents (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Burt, 2002). Many approaches 
are also taken to the notion of corporate social responsibility (hereafter also CSR). In 
particular, if we consider the stakeholder approach (Freeman 1984 and 2000; Freeman 
and Evan, 1990) or the contractarian approach to CSR (Sacconi 2004, 2006, 2007a and 
2007b), relational aspects in terms of trust, trustworthiness, beliefs and dispositions to 
cooperate seem to be fundamental in promoting the coordination processes between the 
firm and its stakeholders that are essential to implement CSR practices.
1 Even though 
SC and CSR seem to share several features, their relationship has not yet been analysed 
in depth.  
In this paper we model the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders and 
show  analytically  how  (cognitive)  social  capital  and  corporate  social  responsibility 
generate (structural) social capital.  
 
                                                 
1 Relational elements concerning the relationship between the firm and its stakeholders are indubitably 
less important if  we look at other CSR approaches. Neither Friedman (1977) nor Jensen (2001), for 
example, give much space to explicit consideration of the stakeholder’s interests by the owners of firms. 
The idea of Friedman is that the only social responsibility of a firm is to make profits while respecting the 
rules, which means without breaking the law. Jensen’s contention is that in the long term maximization of 
the shareholder value is the best way to satisfy also the stakeholders’ interests that the multi-stakeholder 
approach to CSR wants to protect.   3 
1.2  Social capital 
Taking into account the multi-dimensional character of SC (e.g. Paldam, 2000), and 
starting from the distinction drawn by Uphoff (1999), we consider a cognitive and a 
structural dimension of the concept. In our approach, the former dimension essentially 
refers to the dispositional characters of agents that affect their propensity to behave in 
different  ways.  The  latter  refers  to  social  networks  that  connect  agents.  More 
specifically, we approach the idea of cognitive social capital by focusing on trustworthy 
attitudes  grounded  on  preferences  for  social  norm  compliance,  in  turn  based  on 
reciprocal beliefs and more basic dispositions to conformity. Reciprocal beliefs (in the 
behaviour of others) depend on the behaviour that others have already exhibited in the 
past but can be generated (or reinforced) by ethical commitments undertaken by them 
(for example, if agents subscribe to an agreement on an ideal principle). Dispositions 
stem principally from more basic cultural traits in the community where agents live; but 
they  also  depend  on  micro  elements  (e.g.  genetic  and  psychological  factors).  Both 
beliefs  and  dispositions  can  promote  (or,  obviously,  reduce)  trust  and  propensity  to 
cooperate. Structural social capital is constituted by cooperative linkages among agents. 
We consider four main factors able to promote the creation of structural social capital 
(three pertaining to the cognitive dimension of social capital, the fourth to the structure 
of  interaction):  (i)  reciprocal  beliefs  that  others w i l l  c o o p e r a t e ,  ( i i )  d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  
cooperate, (iii) agreements on social norms and principles that may activate reciprocal 
beliefs and dispositions and translate them into motives to act (this is the point where 
the  logical  connection  with  CSR  will  become  stringent)  and  (iv)  the  existence  of 
credible sanctions against the agents that decide not to cooperate.
2 Our definitions of 
structural and cognitive social capital differ from those proposed by Uphoff. However, 
they share some essential characteristics with them. In regard to the structural definition, 
both our approach and that adopted by Uphoff include in this dimension the networks 
that contribute to cooperation. In regard to the cognitive dimension, Uphoff’s approach 
states that this category “derives from mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced 
by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that contribute 
cooperative behavior” (Uphoff, 1999, p.218). We refer to cognitive social capital by 
                                                 
2 See Sacconi and Degli Antoni (2009) for a deeper discussion of these notions of cognitive and structural 
social capital.   4 
focusing on beliefs and dispositions, and we show how they affect the propensity of 
agents to share ethical principles of cooperation. 
1.3  Corporate social responsibility 
We take a contractarian approach to corporate social responsibility and define it as a 
‘model of extended corporate governance whereby those who run a firm (entrepreneurs, 
directors  and  managers)  have  responsibilities  that  range  from  fulfilment  of  their 
fiduciary duties
3 towards the owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary duties towards 
all the firm’s stakeholders’ (Sacconi, 2006). The definition of CSR in terms of extended 
responsibility  towards  all  the  stakeholders  of  the  firm  is  rooted  in  neo-institutional 
theory (Williamson, 1975 and 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; 
Hart, 1995; Hansmann, 1996). According to this approach, the firm is an institutional 
form  of  ‘unified  transactions  governance’  aimed  at  remedying  imperfections  in  the 
contracts that regulate exchange relations among subjects endowed with diverse assets 
(capital,  labour,  instrumental  goods,  and  so  on)  that  may  generate  a  surplus  if  put 
together. The incompleteness of contracts that should regulate the agreements on the 
investment to be made by each agent, and on how the surplus is to be divided among 
them, reduces the incentive of subjects to invest at an optimal level. The firm responds 
to this problem by bringing the various transactions under the control of a hierarchical 
authority which owns the firm and is entitled by its ownership to make decisions on the 
contingencies that were not ex ante contractible.
4 This party is thus safeguarded against 
opportunism by the other stakeholders. Nevertheless, this configuration generates a risk 
for the other parties, which are vulnerable to an abuse of authority (Sacconi, 1999, 2000 
and  2006).  Many  non-controlling  stakeholders  will  ex  ante  be  discouraged  from 
investing at an optimal level, while ex post they will resort to conflicting or disloyal 
behaviour (typically possible when information asymmetry is inherent in the execution 
of some subordinate activity), in the belief that they are being subjected to the abuse of 
authority. Therefore, the optimal level of investment cannot be achieved and a second-
best  solution  arises.  This  result,  which  approximates  social  efficiency,  is  always 
connected with governance solutions based on the allocation of property rights to a 
single party. 
                                                 
3 On the concept of fiduciary duty see Flannigan (1989) and Sacconi (2006).   5 
According to the contractarian approach, this problem can be overcome if CSR is 
viewed  as  ‘extended  governance’  (Sacconi,  2000  and  2006).  The  firm’s  legitimacy 
deficit is remedied if the residual control right is associated with further fiduciary duties 
of the controlling stakeholder towards the non-controlling ones faced with the risk of 
abuse  of  authority.  The  firm  must  be  grounded  on  a  rational  agreement  (the 
constitutional contract of the firm) between those who run it (entrepreneurs, directors 
and managers) and the non-controlling parts (Sacconi, 2006). It is the constitutional 
contract of the firm which determines  
•  that  authority  is  delegated  to  the  stakeholder  most e f f i c i e n t  i n  p e r f o r m i n g  
governance functions;  
•  the fiduciary duties of this party towards the non-controlling stakeholders. 
Once  the  social  contract  of  the  firm  has  been  defined,  the  firm  must  develop  a 
reputation in order to convince all the non-controlling stakeholders that it will respect 
the duties stipulated in the contract. The problem with creating reputation is that the 
firm  and  its  stakeholders  are  characterized  by  settings  in  which  information  or 
knowledge about the action of the firm is incomplete or highly asymmetric.
5 Because of 
incomplete information, the stakeholders cannot verify whether the firm has actually 
behaved  according  to  the  fiduciary  duties  defined  in  the  social  contract  and, 
consequently, the firm cannot develop a reputation. In order to do so, it must adopt an 
explicitly  announced  standard  (a  CSR  standard)  that se ts o u t g e n er a l pr in c ip le s a n d  
whose  contents  are  such  to  elicit  stakeholder  consensus,  as  well  as  explicit 
commitments to comply with principles and rules known ex ante by stakeholders.
6  
1.4  Weak and strong stakeholder 
Finally, with respect to the term ‘stakeholder’, which denotes individuals or groups 
with  a  major  stake  in  the  running  of  the  firm  and  that  are  able  to  influence  it 
significantly  (Freeman  and  McVea,  2002),  we  accept  the  distinction  between 
                                                                                                                                               
4 The decision about the party that must have the residual right of control may depend on various factors - 
e.g. a comparative analysis of the control costs of the various stakeholders: see Sacconi (2006) for a 
deeper explanation. 
5 For a deeper explanation of this theory of reputation under unforeseen contingencies see Sacconi (2000 
and 2004). 
6 For the design of a CSR management standard that corresponds to the features now defined: Sacconi 
DeColle Baldin (2003) and Clarkson Centre for Business Ethics (2002).   6 
stakeholders in the strict or in the broad sense. The former are stakeholders who have an 
interest  at  stake  because  they  have  made  specific  investments  in  the  firm  (i.e. 
investments that may significantly increase the total value generated by the firm and 
that are made in relation to a specific firm and not any other). Stakeholders in the broad 
sense are stakeholders connected to the firm because they undergo the ‘external effects’ 
of the transactions performed by it, even if they do not directly participate in those 
transactions. With respect to this classification we introduce, within the category of 
stakeholders  in  a  strict  sense,  the  original  distinction  between  strong  and  weak 
stakeholders. Strong and weak stakeholders are distinguished by the consequences that 
the breaking-off of the relationship with the firm produces both on the stakeholder and 
on the firm.  
a)  Strong  stakeholder.  The  difference  between  the  discounted  payoff  that s t r o n g  
stakeholders and firms obtain by cooperating forever and by defecting at the first stage 
(and never cooperating again) is positive. Strong stakeholders are stakeholders in the 
strict sense that bring strategic assets into the firm. They are, for example, highly skilled 
workers or institutional investors. 
b) Weak stakeholder. Weak stakeholders would like to cooperate forever with the 
firm, but the discounted payoff that the firm obtains by cooperating forever with them is 
lower than the payoff it obtains by defecting at the first stage and never cooperating 
again. Weak stakeholders are stakeholders in the strict sense who do not bring strategic 
assets into the firm. They are, for example, ordinary investors, unskilled workers or 
unskilled contractors. 
1.5  Main results and outline of the chapter 
Considering the notions of cognitive and structural SC, a contractarian approach to 
CSR and the distinction between strong and weak stakeholders, we develop a model 
that yields three main results. 
1.  The  level  of  cognitive  SC,  in  terms  of  generic  community  or  society-wide 
disposition  to  comply  with  fair  social  norms,  plays a  k e y  r o l e  i n  p r o v i d i n g  
opportunities for the firm to agree (with strong stakeholders) on CSR principles 
of fairness and hence to induce incentives to comply with them with respect to 
all the stakeholders, especially the weak ones.   7 
2.  The explicit agreement on CSR principles and norms engenders cognitive social 
capital on its own. It does so by creating room for conformist preferences that 
exploit beliefs of mutual conformity and dispositions to conform by converting 
them  into  specific  reasons  to  comply  with  an  agreed p r i n c i p l e  o f  C S R .  
Moreover,  the  agreement  on  CSR  principles  of  fairness  by  itself  (through 
framing effects and default reasoning) positively affects beliefs about reciprocal 
conformity on the part of the firm and its strong stakeholders.  
3.  The  level  of  cognitive  social  capital  (both  beliefs a n d  d i s p o s i t i o n s )  a n d  t h e  
decision  to  adopt  CSR  principles  and  norms  (that  translates  the  former  into 
conformist  preferences)  generate  structural  social  capital  understood  as  long-
term  cooperative  relationships  between  the  firm  and i t s  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  e v e n  
though,  on  considering  the  material  payoffs  characterizing  the  single 
relationships,  the  firm  would  have  no  incentive  to  cooperate  with  weak 
stakeholders. We show that strong stakeholders endowed with high cognitive 
social capital, which start cooperating with a firm that adopts a CSR standard, 
have  an  interest  in  punishing  the  firm  if  it  is  not c o o p e r a t i v e  w i t h  w e a k  
stakeholders.  The  sanction  may  induce  the  firm  to  cooperate  with  weak 
stakeholders as well, and it generates cooperative networks that would not be 
sustainable without the power of the sanction.  
The second section presents the analytical framework used to study the networks of 
relations  between  firms  and  stakeholders.  It  analyzes  these  relations  by  considering 
Prisoners’  Dilemmas  (with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  the  firm  and  weak 
stakeholders) and an enlarged version of the Trust Game (relationship between the firm 
and strong stakeholders), also illustrating a basic flaw in this literature on social capital. 
The third section considers the possibility that agents are not motivated exclusively by 
material payoffs (the idea of conformist preferences is introduced) and reinterprets the 
relationship between the firm and its strong stakeholders by introducing a psychological 
game with its psychological payoffs and equilibria. This section illustrates the role of 
cognitive social capital in affecting the psychological payoff of the firm and of strong 
stakeholders. Section four shows how cognitive social capital (in terms of disposition), 
agreed CSR principles, and learning from iterated games played in the network affect 
the strong stakeholder’s strategy in interacting with the firm. Discussed in particular is   8 
the  effect  of  CSR  and  of  the  firm’s  behaviour  in  repeated  games  with  its  weak 
stakeholders  on  strong  stakeholders’  belief  formation  and  strategy.  It  is  argued  that 
cooperation in the network is supported by cognitive social capital. The fifth section 
analytically  presents  the  mechanism  behind  the  formation  of  firm’s  and  strong 
stakeholders’ beliefs and the strategies determined by how iterated games involving the 
firm and all its stakeholders in the network are played. Thus repeated strategies are 
defined  that  induce  cooperation  and  the  endogenous  sanctioning  of  ‘defection’  and 
‘unfair behaviour’. Section six verifies that the strategies inducing cooperation in all the 
games  the  firm  plays  with  its  stakeholders  satisfy  a  condition  of  sustainability  and 
stability in the psychological game played by the firm and its strong stakeholders, this 
being  seen  as  a  stage  sub-game  in  the  entire  iterated  interaction  among  all  the 
participants in the network. Herein resides the paper’s main result: the demonstration 
that, due to conformist preference and psychological payoffs (i.e. the way in which the 
model depicts the players’ cognitive social capital) cooperative behaviour throughout 
the entire network (namely the emergence of structural social capital) is a sub-game 
perfect equilibrium due to the stage-game equilibria of the psychological game wherein 
strong stakeholders have the proper incentive to punish the firm’s deviations from a 
strategy of multilateral cooperation. Section seven identifies and verifies the conditions 
guaranteeing that the multilateral cooperative strategy played by the firm in the repeated 
games with each of its stakeholder satisfies the condition for the existence of repeated 
games Nash equilibria. In accordance with standard treatments of repeated games, it is 
shown that, when cognitive social capital is sufficiently high and beliefs are coherent 
with the cooperative equilibrium in the psychological game, for reasonable values of the 
firm’s discount factors δ , the firm will cooperate also with weak stakeholders in order 
to continue its cooperation with strong stakeholders. Section eight concludes. 
2. A relational network involving the firm and its (strong and weak) stakeholders 
2.1 The analytical framework 
We will analyse the relational networks between firms and stakeholders by using the 
analytical framework suggested by Lippert and Spagnolo (2009) (hereafter L&S), which 
is summarized here for the reader’s convenience (see also Lippert, 2010, infra). L&S 
study relational networks in order to investigate the power of sanctions and networks’ 
equilibrium  conditions  under  different  configurations  and  information  transmission   9 
technologies. Consider a set  { } n N ,..., 1 =  of infinitely lived agents i  N ∈ . The agents 
can interact in pairs according to a connection structure C of two element subsets of N. 
Ci is the set of connections that characterizes agent i. In each period t, the agents that are 
connected play a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) with payoffs given by the matrix of Figure. 
1. The payoff structure is: li,j<di,j<ci,j <wi,j and li,j + wi,j <2ci,j, ∀  i, j  N ∈ , i ≠ j and the 
stage game is assumed to be constant over time. The pay offs imply  the static Nash 
equilibrium (Di,j, Dj,i). Agents are assumed to interact repeatedly; time is discrete; all 
agents  are  assumed  to  have  a  discount  factor  δ <1;
7 a g e n t s  a r e  a s s u m e d  t o  a i m  a t  
maximizing their discounted utility. 
Figure 1 Generalized form of the PDs played by pairs of players located at any 
adjacent mode of the network 
  A g e n t   j 
   C ji D ji 
Cij c i,j, cj,i l i,j, wj,i  Agent i 
Dij w i,j, lj,i  di,j, dj,i, 
According to L&S’s definition, two agents share a relation (R) if they repeatedly 
play (Cij,Cji). Individual gains are defined by means of the following notation:  ij g  is the 
net expected discounted gain of agent i from the relation with player j and it is the 
difference between the discounted payoff that agent i gets by playing (Ci,j, Cj,i) forever 
and defecting and starting to play the static Nash equilibrium (Di,j, Dj,i) thereafter: 
j i j i j i ij d w c g , , , ) 1( δ δ − − − ≡  
A relation of player i with player j in which  ij g <0 is called a ‘deficient relation’ for 
player i; a relation of player i with player j in which  ij g 0 is called ‘non-deficient’ for 
player i; a relation between i and j is called ‘mutual’ iff  ij g 0 and  ji g 0; it is called 
‘unilateral’ iff either  ij g <0 and  ji g  0 or  ij g 0 and gji < 0; and it is called ‘bilaterally 
deficient’ iff  ij g <0 and  ji g <0.  
                                                 
7 Additive separability of agents’ payoffs across interactions and across time is assumed for simplicity.   10 
A  graphical  representation  of  the  possible  kinds  of r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  i a n d  j 
according to the value of  ij g  is as follows:  
•  an incoming arrow to player i represents a non-deficient relation for player i (i.e 
ij g 0) 
•  an outgoing arrow from player i represent a deficient relation for player i (i.e 
ij g <0). 
According to the above definition, Figures 2a) and b) depict unilateral relations. Figure 
2c) depicts a mutual relation and Figure 2d) depicts a bilaterally deficient relation.  
Lippert and Spagnolo (2009) start from this framework to analyse the sustainability 
of different network configurations under three information transmission mechanisms 
(Perfect Information Transmission; No Information Transmission; Network Information 
Transmission)  and  considering  two  types  of  multilateral  strategy:  multilateral  grim 
trigger strategies and multilateral repentance strategies.  
Figure 2 Graphical representation of relations 
a)                 j                               i        ij g 0 and  ji g <0 
 
b)                 j                                 i       ji g  0 and  ij g <0 
 
c)                 j                                i            ij g 0 and  ji g 0 
 
d)                 j                                  i            ij g <0 and  ji g <0 
 
We  focus  our  analysis  on  the  situation  under  perfect  information  transmission 
considered by L&S. Under Perfect Information Transmission every player observes the 
actions taken by any other player in the network.
8 It can be shown that a sustainable 
                                                 
8 We will slightly modify this assumption in our model.   11 
strategy  profile  for  the  network  is  the  adoption  by e v e r y  a g e n t  o f  t h e  M G  t r i g g e r  
strategy: 
Every player i 
s N ∈  
1. starts playing Cij ∀j i R ∈ , 
2. continues playing Cij ∀j i R ∈  as long as s/he observes Cmn ∀m,n
s N ∈ , and 
3. reverts to Dij ∀j i R ∈  forever otherwise. 
The resulting relational network is sustainable if each player prefers to cooperate 
with all his/her neighbours rather than deviating from playing cooperatively with regard 
to any subgroup of them and facing retaliation from all neighbours. If a player decides 
to deviate from his/her relations with any subgroup of his/her neighbours, s/he faces 
retaliation from all neighbours and can thus just as well (and should optimally) deviate 
from all his/her  relations.  In terms of net  gains from cooperation this result can be 
expressed as follows: 
Under Perfect Information Transmission (I1), a relational network is sustainable if 
and only if  ∈ ∈ ∀ ≥
i R j
s
ij N i g 0 
The following Table 1 summarizes the basic notation used throughout the paper.  
Table 1 Basic notation used throughout the paper 
E  Firm - Enterprise  e; ¬e  Enter,  non-enter  strategy  in  the  PG  (strategy 
which may be played by SS) 
SS F i r m ’ s   s t r o n g   s t a k e h o l d e r s   P D Ej P r i s o n e r ’ s   D i l e m m a ( s )   p l a y e d   i n   t h e   n e t w o r k  
connecting the firm E with its weak stakeholder 
SWj where j = 1,2 
SWj F i r m ’ s   w e a k   s t a k e h o l d e r   j  CEj  E’s Cooperative strategy in the PDs 
PG  Psychological  Game  involving 
the  firm  and  its  Strong 
Stakeholders 
DEj  E’s Non-Cooperative strategy in the PDs 
U 
 
Collusive strategy of SS in the PG 
inducing an Unfair treatment  
T  CSR ideal principle with which agents endowed 







The SS’s Fair strategy in the PG 
 
The E’s Fair strategy in the PG  
 
The E’s collusive Unfair  strategy 
in the PG 
λ   Exogenous  parameter  representing  the 
disposition to conform with the ideal principle T  
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2.2   Modeling the network linking the firm and its stakeholders 
The above analytical framework is used in this section to model the relationship of 
the  firm  with  its  weak  and  strong  stakeholders.  Consider  the  relational  network  of 
Figure 3.
9  
Figure 3 A relational Network including The Firm and its Stakeholders 
 
A strong stakeholder (SS), locked by mutually dependent specific investments into 
the transaction carried out in cooperation with the firm, and the firm (‘enterprise’ E) are 
connected  by  a  mutual  not  deficient  relation,  while th e  f ir m E  h a s a lso  u n ila te r a lly  
deficient relations with two categories of weak stakeholders (SW1;SW2) that, in turn, 
have relations with other members of the social network. To give a specific example of 
the  network,  we  may  imagine  that:  SW2 a r e  e m p l o y e e s  i n  a  p l a n t  o w n e d  b y  t h e  
Multinational Enterprise E in a poor developing country, where E has relocated mature 
productive processes for some of the items that it traditionally supplies to the global 
market,  whereas  SW1 i s  t h e  f i r s t  f i r m  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u p p l y  c h a i n  furnishing 
components that E continues to assemble in the old plant at its headquarters located in a 
rich  developed  country.  SS m a y  c o n s i s t  o f  h i g h - s k i l l e d  c o r e  e m p l o y e e s  a t  t h e  
headquarters belonging to the same local community as E’s managers, well unionised 
and endowed with some threat power, or pension funds holding a significant share in E. 
Agent 3 is a second-order supplier firm (located in a developing country) within E’s 
supply-chain (i.e. a supplier firm to E’s direct supplier); agent 4 represents firm 3’s 
employees (assumed to be better paid than SW2), and agent 5 represents the developing 
country’s retailers whose best customers are the workers belonging to 3 (whereas they 
                                                 
9 This network configuration allows us to consider all the characteristics of the relationship between 
strong stakeholders, weak stakeholders and firms we are interested in to the aim of this paper. We will not 
study either other possible network configurations or the density of the relationship characterizing this 
network (this may be a further extension of the present analysis). 
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are less interested in satisfying demand by SW2, who are too poor to be commercially 
attractive). 
2.2.1. The games involving the firm and its weak stakeholders 
We start the analysis of the network by focusing on the relationship between the firm 
and the two weak stakeholders. According to our definition of weak stakeholders, we 
suppose that each SWj (for j = 1,2) makes an effort to become unique to E by investing 
idiosyncratically in their human capital and dedicated technologies and processes, in 
order to increase their value to E. However, E still considers  each SWj replaceable, 
because its main reason for relocating and having this foreign supply chain is to cut 
labour costs, wages, etc. Each SWj wants to maintain the cooperative relation with E, 
while E is not symmetrically interested in continuous cooperative relations with any of 
them,  and  seriously  considers  the  short-term  convenience  of  breaching  at  any  time 
labour and supply chain contracts in order to relocate its plants elsewhere (where wages 
are even lower) or recruiting new suppliers offering components at even lower prices. 
Note that not cooperating does not imply for the firm the complete severing of any 
connection with SWj. It may merely take the form of maintaining a network of not truly 
cooperative relations within which E tries to expropriate opportunistically all the surplus 
that SW1 and SW2 may expect as the equitable remuneration of their investments. Hence, 
in our model, E taking all the surplus amounts to a continuing network in which E acts 
uncooperatively towards SWj. 
To put the relation between the firm and each weak stakeholder in formal terms, we 
assume that they play iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games (hereafter also PDs). The 
firm may cooperate or not cooperate in the PDs with weak stakeholders where:  
A.  cooperating means for E underwriting a long-term contract including guarantees 
reassuring each SWj about his/her appropriation of a reasonably equitable part of 
the surplus generated;  
B.  not  cooperating  means  for  E  threatening  to  breach  short-term  supply  chain 
contracts or incomplete labour contracts in order to extract all the surplus from 
SWj. 
We  assume  that  the  discount  rate  δ E t h a t  a l l o w s  E  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  t h e  l o n g - t e r m  
mutual benefits produced by SWj specific investments in term of increasing returns is   14 
not  high  enough  to  counterbalance  the  short-term  incentive  to  appropriate  all  the 
surplus, which depends on the strategic possibility of keeping salaries and prices paid to 
the developing country’s workers and supply-chain firms very low (note that in any 
repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma there are many possible equilibria and some of them allow 
substantial exploitation of one player over the other).  
Finally, according to our approach, even though each SWj would like to cooperate 
with the firm in the PDs, they also have some defection capability (it is for this reason 
that we model the relationship using PDs). Weak stakeholders SWj are assumed to be 
able to defect (and retaliate against the firm) by using the only weapon available to 
them: maintaining low effort and poor quality of the goods and services provided as 
long as E has imperfect monitoring ability on their actions.  
2.2.2  The game involving the firm and its strong stakeholder 
The relationship established by E with SS comprises various elements which, as we 
shall see, make a modified version of the Trust Game suitable for its formalization. 
Specific investments are assumed to be symmetrical and mutually dependent between 
the firm and strong stakeholders. E (SS) specific investment depends for realization of 
its value on maintenance of the cooperative relation with SS (E). Essentially , strong 
stakeholders depend for their welfare on the continuity of the cooperative relation with 
E; but vice versa, E depends on their cooperation for its continuing existence. This does 
not mean that they lack an exit strategy that interrupts or reduces the rate of cooperation, 
or a strategy that enables free riding on the other party’s cooperative effort. In fact a key 
feature of the game is that SS may choose to stay out of the interaction with E if s/he 
does not trust E enough to play a cooperative strategy with it. Nevertheless, continuing 
cooperation in this case far outweighs the discounted value of resorting to these defect 
strategies.  
On this interpretation it is quite natural to suppose that SS, as far as his/her material 
payoff  is  concerned,  may  collude  with  enterprise  E  in  order  to  appropriate  all  the 
surplus  generated  by  the  set  of  specific  investments  made  in  relation  to  the  firm. 
Interpretatively,  we  may  assume  that  these  are  made b y  b o t h  s t r o n g  a n d  w e a k  
stakeholders, although continuous cooperation with the latter is less essential to the firm 
than with the former (so that expropriation of weak stakeholders may be preferred by   15 
the firm). On the other hand, both types of stakeholder depend  on the firm in order to 
realize their investments.  
In order to capture this key point of our analysis, we model the relationship between 
strong stakeholders and the firm by considering a game with two active players, SS and 
E, and a dummy player that ideally represents the category of weak stakeholders (SW) 
affected by interaction involving the two active players. This entails that SS and E may 
decide  either  to  collude  so  that  no  resources  are  invested  (or  reserved)  in  order  to 
improve the cooperation with weak stakeholders in the games that the firm will play 
with them in the remaining part of the network, or to treat them according to equitable 
terms. This means allocating part of an existing surplus for the purpose of increasing 
weak stakeholders’ payoffs to an equitable distribution in the games that they will play 
with  the  firm  in  further  parts  of  the  network.  We  will  see  that  the  effective 
implementation of this decision – if it has been taken at this stage – can be interpreted as 
depending on a cooperative decision by the firm in the ensuing games. For the moment, 
however, we maintain that if this decision is taken by SS and E, it generates payoffs also 
for weak stakeholders (the best interpretation is that SWj payoffs are saved to be given to 
them in the ensuing games). Here, therefore, weak stakeholders are taken as dummy 
players because at this stage they can only be subject to the effects of the firm and 
strong  stakeholder’s  interaction,  without  having  any  voice  in  it.  They  will  become 
active players only later, when they participate in games where they interact directly 
with the firm at further nodes of the relational network. Technically, this means that – 
with reference to the network of games in Figure 3 – the game played by E and SS is 
different in form from games played by E and any SWj later in the network. Figure 4 
illustrates this game in extensive form. The normal form corresponding to the extensive 
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Figure 5  The stage-game played by the firm E and its strong stakeholder SS 
- Normal form 
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            e, F  2, 2, (2)  2, 4, (0) 
            e, U  4, 2, (0)  3, 3, (0) 
           ¬ e  1, 1, (1)  1, 1, (1) 
 
In  both  figures,  the  dummy  player’s  payoffs  are  reported  within  brackets  and 
represent the share of a total surplus that active players refrain from appropriating so 
that they can pay equitable wages or prices to SWj. Thus, the dummy player’s payoffs 
are only stakes that weak stakeholders hold in the firm’s operation (payoffs are reported 
within brackets and the dummy player has no strategy in the game), whereas strong 
stakeholders not only hold stakes in the firm but also exercise influencing power.  
As said, the game considered is a modified version of the Trust Game. Before SS 
plays the interaction with the firm, s/he has a move where s/he may choose to enter (e) 
or stay out of (¬e) the relation with E. Entering means trusting E and making a specific 
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investment in relation to it. If SS decides to enter into a relation with the firm, E has two 
possible strategies available.  It may implement a collusive strategy (UE) that allows 
itself and SS to appropriate all the surplus if SS enters and plays U as well (see payoffs 
(3,3,0)), or it may implement a fair division rule, FE, that allocates a fair share to the 
dummy player only if SS enters and plays F as well. This entails saving a share of the 
surplus (equal to 2) to which the weak stakeholders are entitled (see the extensive form 
of the game in Figure 4 and its normal form in Figure 5, where this occurs with the 
payoffs (2,2,2)). One-sided opportunistic behaviour against S S occurs when SS enters 
and plays ‘fair’ (strategy F) by restraining his/her claim, but E cheats  and appropriates 
all the residual so that nothing is left for the dummy player. In this case we say that E is 
abusing  SS’s  trust,  in  so  far  as  we  understand  SS’s  entrance,  if  s/he  plays  (e,F),  as 
expressing his/her intention to behave equitably toward weak stakeholders. However, 
one-sided opportunistic behaviour may also occur the other way round: SS may claim 
the larger portion of the surplus while E moderates its pretensions. Without effective 
coordination on the pair of strategies F, we assume that the party which claims more by 
playing U is in fact able to reap the larger part of the surplus (consider payoffs (2,4,0) 
and (4,2,0)).  
An important feature of this game is that by entering a collusive agreement (e,U;UE), 
or acquiescing with the firm’s opportunistic behaviour UE, SS puts the dummy player in 
a situation even worse than when SS refuses to enter by ¬e. In other words, because of 
SS’s essential role in generating the firm’s surplus and in allowing the firm’s activity 
(for example, the key role of institutional investors), egoistic collusion involving both 
SS and E, or at least SS’s acquiescence with E’s opportunism, is strictly necessary for the 
complete  expropriation  of  the  dummy  player.  Hence  a S S t h a t  c a r e s  a l s o  f o r  t h e  
dummy’s welfare and is aware of E’s devious strategy for getting around its candid self-
restraint  move,  has  an  alternative  for  the  pursuit  of  full  fairness.  This  consists  in 
boycotting  E  on  behalf  of  the  dummy’s  (second-best) s t a k e s  i n  t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n .  T o  
exemplify a possible weak stakeholder situation, imagine a small firm which converts 
its productive plant so as to become a specialized supplier to a multinational enterprise. 
After the specific investment has been made, the multinational enterprise demands to 
change the supply contract, threatening that otherwise it will find a different supplier. 
This generates a situation which is worse for the supplier than the situation antecedent 
to the specific investment. The idea is that staying out of a relation with the firm may   18 
prevent  the  strong  stakeholder  from  inducing  weak  stakeholders  to  make  specific 
investments that will be expropriated. 
 
2.2.3   The SS-E game’s equilibrium solution and the instability of GM trigger 
strategies.  
The only Nash equilibrium solution of this game is (e,U;UE), which, moreover, is in 
dominant strategies. This entails that the solution of this simple two-person division 
game is such that both players play the collusive and egoistic strategy U. Because it is 
the unique equilibrium point in dominant strategies of the one shot game, it will also be 
one equilibrium point of the repeated game that has this game as a stage-game. Hence 
one obvious equilibrium profile of the repeated game is for SS (after having entered) and 
the firm E to adopt the iterated strategy ‘play U at the first stage and thereafter, no 
matter what the other player does’. In the interpretive context adopted here, this solution 
amounts to socially irresponsible conduct by the firm with respect to weak stakeholders, 
while  a  collusive  agreement  is  reached  with  the  strong  one  (for  example  unions  or 
pension funds).  
The  unique  equilibrium  in  dominant  strategies  clarifies  the  extent  to  which  this 
modified  version  of  the  Trust  Game  (TG)  differs  from  the  original  TG,  where  the 
unique  Nash  equilibrium  would  be  “not  entering”  for t h e  s t a k e h o l d e r .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
staying out is not the SS’s best response, because “abuse” is at the expense of a third 
party, the weak stakeholder. In the original TG, staying out is a credible threat that the 
trustor  may  implement  by  means  of  a  repeated  game  equilibrium  strategy,  if  s/he 
believes that the trustee will play the dominant strategy of the one shot game, since it is 
also part of the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game. This is not the case here, 
because staying out is the worst payoff to SS, and would not be a credible move that a SS 
motivated to care also about SWj’s well-being could make in order to deter adoption of a 
collusive unfair strategy by E.   
Note that on this point our analysis significantly differs from that conducted by L&S 
(see  Lippert  and  Spagnolo  2009).  But  it  also  highlights  a  problem  inherent  to  the 
analytical  framework  of  relational  networks.  L&S  consider  a  network  like  the  one 
described  in  Figure  3  but  in  which  all  the  players’ r e l a t i o n s  ( i n c l u d i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
between  SS a n d  E )  a r e  m o d e l e d  a s  i t e r a t e d  P D s .  T h e y  s t a t e  t h a t,  under  perfect 
information and assuming that all players adopt the MG trigger strategy, a network of 
this kind would be sustainable (in the sense that all the players would cooperate with   19 
each other) because of the threat of endogenous sanction against defectors implicit in 
the structure of MG trigger strategies. We raise a basic objection against this approach: 
why should player SS implement the sanction (by stopping his/her cooperation with E) 
if s/he learns that the E has defected against other players in the network? Since the 
cooperative relation between SS and E is mutual, and given that no other player can 
sanction SS if s/he deviates from his/her MG trigger strategy, there are no endogenous 
material incentives for SS to sanction E if E defects with the weak stakeholders. It seems 
that the MG trigger strategy would require player SS to behave contrary to rationality, so 
that  the  sanctioning  behaviour  implicit  in  player  SS’s  MG  trigger  strategy  is  an 
ineffectual  threat  to  player  E,  unable  to  prevent  it  from  ‘defecting’  with  its  weak 
stakeholders.  
The game we have introduced to model the SS -E relationship is explicitly intended 
to show even more clearly the instability of the MG trigger strategy in the case of a 
deviation  from  cooperation.  This  problem,  in  fact,  would  entail  elimination  of  the 
equilibrium based on the MG trigger strategies played by all the network participants as 
a sub-game imperfect equilibrium (specifically, imperfection would result, within the 
overall dynamic game constituted by the repeated games that any pair of adjacent agents 
plays in the network, from the irrationality of the behaviour required in the sub-game 
played by E and SS in Figure 3). 
We  shall  discuss  this  point  by  showing  how  the  game s p e c if i e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s 
subsection enables us to introduce a psychological game PG which in its turn will make 
it possible to formalize player SS’s and E’s MG trigger strategy in a way that evades this 
instability (equilibrium imperfection) problem. This amounts to showing that cognitive 
social capital and the adoption of CSR principles – which we will characterize in term 
of the elements of the PG game – generate endogenous incentives for SS to punish the 
firm if it defects against the weak stakeholders. 
3.  A psychological game  
3.1  Conformist preferences  
Our assumption is that the game played by the E and SS described in the previous 
section (see Figure 4 and Figure 5) is only the basis, in terms of game form and material 
payoffs, for introducing the psychological game PG played by active players (the firm E 
and  its  strong  stakeholder  SS)  endowed  with  the  cognitive  social  capital  that  we   20 
associate with the concept of conformist preferences (Grimalda and Sacconi 2005 and 
2007; Sacconi 2007a, Sacconi and Faillo 2010). A psychological game results directly 
from the former simply by adding the assumption that the players’ payoffs are defined 
in terms of psychological utility functions (see Geanakoplos et al. 1989, Rabin 1993). 
Our  specification  of  the  psychological  game  is  based  on  the  idea  of  conformist 
preferences.  
According  to  the  conformist  preferences  model,  agents  have  preferences  that  are 
defined over states of affairs described as sets of interdependent actions characterized in 
terms of their degree of consistency  with a given abstract principle or ideal. Essentially, 
the model of conformist preferences is based on the idea that agents are motivated not 
only by material incentives, but also by the desire to conform with some ideal principle, 
which in the original model (proposed by Grimalda and Sacconi 2005 and 2007) is a 
normative principle of welfare distribution, given the players’ belief in others players’ 
conformity.  
The utility function of a generic agent i characterized by conformist preferences is 
)] ( [ ) ( σ λ σ T F U V i i i + =  
where the first term  ) (σ i U is the material utility obtained by agent i in state σ . The 
second  term,  )] ( [ σ λ T F i  i s  t h e  a g e n t ’ s  i d e a l  u t i l i t y  a n d  r e p r e s e n t s  c o n f o r mist 
preferences  reflecting  the  agent’s  concern  for  reasons  to  act  different  from  the 
traditional  consequentialist  ones.  Essentially,  these  reasons  amount  to  a  desire  to 
conform with a normative principle T which is believed to be reciprocally conformed 
with – up to some level – by the agent itself and by the other agents participating in the 
same interaction through the production (by means of the agents’ behaviours) of the 
social state of affairs σ . 
First, the ideal principle T represents the principle on which agents agree in a pre-
play communication stage under the ‘veil of ignorance’. In our analysis it represents the 
CSR principle on which the firm and stakeholders agree from a position of impartiality 
and which makes explicit the firm’s commitments in terms of fiduciary duties towards 
all the its stakeholders. In general, the formal specification of T, intended to express the 
agreed criterion of fair distribution among all the players (irrespectively off their strong 
or weak positions), is  given by the Nash Bargaining Solution, also called the Nash 
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where  i d  stands  for  the  reservation  utility  that  player  i c a n  o b t a i n  w h e n  t h e  
bargaining process collapses. Note that the status quo payoffs reflect the hypothesis that 
the  agreement  is  signed  under  the  symmetric  position  engendered  by  a  ‘veil  of 
ignorance’.  
Second, the weight  i λ  (a positive number), is an exogenous parameter representing 
the maximum possible magnitude of the disposition to conform with the ideal principle 
T. The intensity of the motivation to conform with the principle T for agent i is then 
related to the value of  i λ . The higher  i λ  is, the more agent i will be disposed to conform 
with the principle T, granted that it has been agreed and that agent i believes that the 
others will conform with the same principle. The parameter  i λ  represents a component 
of cognitive social capital defined in terms of a generic disposition to conform with 
shared or agreed social norms, and it is taken to be an endowment of cognitive social 
capital (meaning disposition) that agent i inherits from his/her social environment (it 
can also be considered a biological trait fixed through evolution).  
Third, the function F captures the effects on ideal utility of beliefs about the degree 
of reciprocal conformity with the ideal exhibited by the agent him/herself and other 
agents.  F t h e r e f o r e  e x p r e s s e s  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  o f  o u r  i d e a  o f  c ognitive  social  capital 
understood as a system of mutual beliefs on the degree of norm compliance exhibited 
by a given state of affairs (strategy combination) of the game. Following Grimalda and 
Sacconi (2005), we adopt a specification for F based on the hypothesis that each agent 
has a measure of his/her own conformity with the principle T, given what s/he believes 
about other agents, and that at the same time the agent has a measure of how much other 
agents’ are believed to reciprocate conformity given their own beliefs.  
Let us consider a two-person game. In this case, F can be specified by considering 
two elements:
10 
1.  1+ i f : the index of player’s i conditional conformity. The value of  i f  depends 
on the extent to which player i contributes to fulfilling the ideal T with his/her 
actions (i.e. by conforming with or deviating from the ideal), given what s/he 
believes about the other player’s choice. 
                                                 
10 See Appendix I for a formal representation of F.   22 
2.  1+ j f
~
: the index of player’s j expected reciprocity in conformity, or the esteem 
that player i forms concerning j’s compliance with the ideal T. The value of 
j f
~
depends on the extent to which the other player contributes to fulfilling the 
ideal T with his/her actions (i.e. by conforming with or deviating from the ideal 
T), given what the second player believes (and the first player believes that the 
second player believes) that the first player will do. 
Both  i f  and  j f
~
 assume values from 0 to -1, so that they represent degrees of deviation 
from  the  best  possible  conformity  with  the  principle  T g i v e n  t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r ’ s  
(believed)  action.  Hence  the  overall  utility  function  of  agent  i c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  
conformist preferences may be written thus (for more details see appendix I): 
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where 
1
i b  is the first-order belief that player i has in the action of player j; 
2
i b  is the second-order belief about player j’s belief in the action adopted by player i. 
It is clear that both conditional conformity and beliefs on reciprocal conformity as  
captured by the function F, and disposition to conform as represented by λ, play a key 
role  in  generating  the  (ideal)  utility  of  player  i.  The  ideal  component  of  the  utility 
function works as follows. 
a)  If i fully conforms with the principle T and believes that j will fully conform as 
well, then i’s ideal utility will be: 
i i λ λ = × × 1 1 
that is, the maximum possible value of ideal utility. 
b)  If i does not fully conform and believes that neither will j fully conform, the 
value of the ideal utility will be lower than  i λ : 
 
i i y x λ λ < − − ) 1 )( 1(  
c)  Finally, if the conformity of at least one of the two agents is believed to be zero, 
then the ideal utility obtained by agent i goes to zero: 
0 ) 1 )( 1 1( = − − i y λ    23 
The ideal principle T, mutual beliefs with regard to reciprocal conformity with the 
ideal principle T, and the disposition (λ) to conform with T, given such beliefs, are the 
components of our notion of cognitive social capital and they collapse into the value of 
ideal utility that the conformist agent may obtain for each give state of affairs. Hence 
conformist preferences equate to our definition of cognitive social capital.  
As we have already noted, the disposition λ is generated by both micro and macro 
factors. It is connected with psychological and genetic factors that affect the disposition 
of each individual, and it is affected by basic social norms and cultural traits shared in 
the community where the agents live in a broad sense. These social norms are more 
general  than  the  principle  T,  which  is  a  principle  on  which  agents  may  agree  with 
reference to a definite domain of interactions or an organisation. Thus, while T is an 
endogenous variable determined by the players’ interaction, normally engendered by 
their pre-play communication (agreement),  λ is a contextual variable that affects the 
magnitude or motivational force of conformist reasons to act as they are represented by 
the functional F of the principle T.  
3.2  A CSR principle at the basis of conformist preferences 
We assume that players with conformist preferences are involved in a psychological 
game PG based on the modified version of the Trust Game described in Figure 4. Hence 
they will evaluate strategy combinations in terms of a fairness (CSR) principle T to 
which they have agreed in a pre-play communication stage of the game and whereby 
they make an impartial distributive justice-based assessment of the division problem 
that they have to solve in the game. The distributive (CSR) principle T is modelled as 
the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of a three-person bargaining situation involving 
players E, SS and a representative agent S Wj – i.e. simply maximizing the product of 
players’ payoffs net of the status quo. The NBS is a natural result of the assumption that 
E, SS and SWj reach agreement on a distributive principle relative to the division of the 
surplus at stake in PG. It is not necessary that this bargaining game be taken as a game 
actually played. What is required is that in a pre-play communication stage the players 
reason ‘as if’ they could carry out such an agreement under the hypothesis that they 
cannot (or do not want to) identify with any particular player’s role in the subsequent 
PG effectively played. Thus, in this ‘counterfactual stage’, they may take all the roles in   24 
the game PG to be symmetrically interchangeable.
11 For this reason, we set the status 
quo at (0,0,0), so that all the players consider the not-fair agreement option from the 
point  of  view  of  the  worst-off  player,  who  would  get nil if there was no impartial 
agreement on the surplus division. We thus express the idea that a fair agreement on the 
principle T must include all the players, and if one player gains nil from the agreement, 
‘behind the veil of ignorance’ this amounts to not agreeing at all. Hence the two-side 
egoistic collusive strategy pair (U;UE), or the one-side egoistic strategy U played against 
a  fair  co-operator,  both  signal  absence  of  reference  to  any  three-person  equitable 
agreement in playing the game. This also enables the strategy ¬e to play a role in the 
solution, since with respect to the worst case of no distribution at all also the stay-out 
option with payoffs (1,1,1) could be considered a possible improvement reachable by 
agreement. Considering the payoff matrix reported in Figure 5, the decreasing ordering 
of the game states assessed according to the principle T – namely, by taking the Nash 
bargaining product of the payoffs corresponding to the relevant states of the game – is  
1.  T(e,F;FE) = 8,  
2.  T(¬e;UE) =1 , as well as T(¬e;FE) = 1,  
3.  T(e,U;UE) = 0 , T(e,F;UE) = 0, T(e,U;FE) = 0. 
where the last line identifies states of non-equitable agreement that are no better than 
the status quo. Note that this ordering states, as previously discussed, that SS’s staying 
out entails a higher level of distributive fairness in terms of Nash product than if s/he 
enters and acquiesces with E’s collusive offer or its opportunistic endeavour to exploit 
SS’s fairness in order to appropriate the entire surplus.  
The two active players’ agreement on a principle of fair treatment including both 
strong and weak stakeholders amounts, in this context, to subscription by the firm to a 
social contract on their fair treatment – which is the core idea of CSR as we understand 
it. Moreover, for both the firm E and the SS the ‘fairness’ strategy corresponds to a 
‘walk the talk’ behaviour with respect to the commitment announced in the CSR norm 
(i.e. a code of ethics), while the ‘stay out’ strategy is similar to a boycotting strategy that 
the active strong stakeholder may (and in real life in fact does) carry  out to punish 
companies  that  do  not  comply  with  the  CSR  commitments  that  they  have  ex  ante 
                                                 
11 Interchangeability is the obvious implication of the ‘veil of ignorance’ hypothesis, and allows putting 
aside the strategic distinction between strong and weak stakeholders and the firm.   25 
enunciated. These intuitions are reflected by the maximum T value assigned to the pair 
of strategies (e,F;FE), and the intermediate T value associated with the states where SS 
decides to stay out, i.e. (¬e;U), (¬e;F). 
However, it might be asked why the firm E and the strong stakeholder SS should 
enter an agreement on the CSR principle T; and in particular what incentive E would 
have to do so. This question is important because – as we shall see in the next sections – 
in the psychological game PG that takes place after players agree on the CSR principle 
T, the player E will be induced not to abuse SWj and, consequently, to give up part of its 
material payoff . One could simply assume that the firm E has a value system and a 
corporate  culture  whose  principles  are  shared  by  strong  stakeholders  and  are 
summarized  by  T.  Yet  in  the  economic  theory  of  the  firm,  ‘corporate  culture’  is  a 
solution for the need to acquire reputation in a context of incompleteness of contracts 
and unforeseen contingencies structured as a TG (Kreps 1990). In a context of this kind, 
the  very  existence  of  definite  commitments  and  types  functional  to  reputation 
accumulation  cannot  be  assumed  without  the  introduction  of  general  and  abstract 
principles of ethics which define, albeit with a margin of vagueness, what has to be 
done under unforeseen contingencies (Sacconi 2000, 2010a). In this case, the firm E 
must at least convince the strong stakeholders to enter the relation with it. Hence the 
firm must reach an agreement with strong stakeholders on general principles of fair 
treatment that may be employed to accumulate a reputation at least in the relation with 
SS. Of course, one may say that in the one shot modified TG the firm E knows that there 
is a unique Nash equilibrium which entails collusion with SS, so that E does not need 
any particular reputation to be able to reach such a collusive agreement with SS. But this 
is not the case in the repeated game, where equilibria are necessarily  multiple, and 
where,  moreover,  the  commitments  attached  to  any  equilibrium  strategy  cannot  be 
specified  in  a  situation  of  unforeseen  contingencies  without  recourse  to  general, 
abstract, albeit vague principles of corporate culture. Our hypothesis is that when the 
firm E endeavours to devise an acceptable agreement on general and abstract principles 
that must concern the division of a sum amongst all the three payers, the very nature of 
the  logical  exercise  of  formulating  such  principles r e q u i r e s  i t  t o  u n i v e r s a l i z e  t h e  
principle of fair treatment, and hence to have exercise of the agreement cover also the 
weak stakeholders (which fact have no real power in the game). This amounts to saying 
that the agreement is reached under the veil of ignorance by active players considering 
the equally probable possibility of being also in the position of the weak stakeholder.   26 
Under this hypothesis we know that the resulting agreement falls on the egalitarian 
solution or symmetrical NBS, as a direct consequence of impartiality when the outcome 
space is restricted to the equilibrium set of the repeated game (Binmore 2005, Sacconi 
2010b). Besides in the theoretical literature, this result is also supported by empirical 
evidence  on  the  collective  choices  reached  by  active  players  involved  in  a  division 
problem similar to the one  considered here. It has been shown that, when active players 
are asked to agree on a rule of division behind a veil of ignorance concerning the role 
that they may assume in playing the game effectively – i.e. they are faced with the 
possibility of occupying the dummy player’s position as well – they quite directly agree 
on the egalitarian rule of division.  
To conclude, also the assumption concerning  λ may play a role, albeit an indirect 
one, in explaining how E or SS can agree on the CSR principle T. In a context of social 
norms and culture wherein the presence of a high disposition to conformity (i.e.  λ is 
high)  is  common  knowledge,  even  agreeing  on  non-binding  CSR  principles  with 
stakeholders through pre-play communication can be considered anything but ‘cheap 
talk’. In fact, this a parameter makes it possible that conformist preferences will be 
formed that  impinge on the players’ payoff function to an extent sufficient to change 
the  possible  results  of  the  game  (of  course,  this  could  also  be  considered  a  good 
strategic reason for a self-interested firm not to agree at all, one to be traded off against 
the signal that this decision would send to stakeholders about its lack of intention to 
develop a reputation). 
  
3.3.  The psychological game (PG) and the ideal payoffs of players E and SS  
 
The previous section linked the game played by E and SS to a basic component of the 
conformist preferences model: agreement on the principle T. However, a full description 
of the relevant PG game requires specification of the psychological payoffs associated 
with any pair of strategies. The overall utility function given in section 3.1 shows that 
players attach a motivational force (able to drive their practical behaviour) to something 
akin to ‘conformity with the principle concern’ – intuitively a ‘deontological’ motive to 
act – which amounts at most to a utility weight λ. This represents the maximal force of 
the disposition to act in conformity with the fairness principle that can counteract self-
referred motives to act represented by material payoffs.     27 
Moreover, the strength of this disposition to act in conformity with a given principle 
(in our case the CSR principle that implies fair behaviour by the firm towards all its 
stakeholders) is conditional upon beliefs that the players entertain about their reciprocal 
conformity with the principle. The functional F represents what a player deems to be the 
overall degree of conformity as based on the combination of the two personal indexes of 
conformity  attached  to  players’  decisions  in  relation  to  the  principle.  Taking  SS’s 
perspective, these indexes state:  
(i)  the extent to which SS conceives him/herself to be conforming by choosing any 
particular strategy, given his/her belief about E’s strategy choice, and  
(ii)  the extent to which SS thinks play er E conforms by  means of any  particular 
strategy that s/he believes E may choose, given SS’s second-order beliefs about 
E’s belief in SS’s choice.  
Recall that the values of the two conformity indexes result from the subtraction of a 
deviation measure ranging between 0 (no deviation at all from the principle) and -1 
(complete deviation) from the unit (i.e. 1 means maximal conformity), and consider in 
turn the different possible belief systems (i.e. first- and second-order beliefs) justifying 
the prediction of any given outcome of the game. Then the conformity indexes attached 
to how players carry out each state of the game (and consequently their ideal utility) 
may  be  computed  with  reference  to  the  basic  game  form  given  in  Figure  4  and  5, 
keeping track of the T values computed for each strategy combination given in section 
3.2. 
12 
Let us start by considering the ideal utility to be added to the material payoff of 
player SS because of his/her conditional conformity index and the expected reciprocal 
conformity index of the firm, namely  ) , ( 1
1
Ss Ss Ss b f σ +  and  ( )
2 1 ,
~
1 Ss Ss E b b f + , as they are 
specified at each possible state of the game. Consider first the strategy  Ss σ = (e,F) of 
player SS given his/her first-order belief that E plays F, (
1
Ss b  = FE), and his/her second-
order belief that E believes that SS plays (e,F), (
2
Ss b  = (e,F)). The index of conditional 
deviation of player SS  is 
       T(e,F;FE) − T
MAX (FE)     T(e,F;FE) − T (e,F;FE)     
⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = 0 ,   
                 T
MAX (FE) − T
MIN(FE)     T (e,F;FE) − T (e,U;FE)        28 
In fact, given that E plays ‘fair’ FE, for SS by responding with (e,F) the best T value is 
attainable, which entails a conditional conformity index 1 + f Ss(e,F;FE)= 1. For the 
same strategy pair, by symmetrical reasons, the expected reciprocal deviation of player 
E is  
T(FE;e,F) − T
MAX (e,F)  T(FE; e,F) − T (FE;e,F)     
   ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯   =   ——————————    = 0 ,  
      T
MAX (e,F) − T
MIN(e,F)   T (FE;e,F) − T(UE;e,F)   
 
which entails that the expected reciprocal conformity index of player E is 1+ fE(FE;e,F) 
= 1. Thus the ideal utility of player SS for this strategy combination is the full weight λ  
(namely,  λ × ×1 1) .    
By  the  same  method,  SS’s  conditional  conformity  indexes  and  E’s  expected 
reciprocal conformity indexes can be computed for each strategy pair, and the ideal 
utility of player SS can be derived (see the appendix to this chapter for calculations). 
The results are the following:  
•  Player SS’s strategy (e,F), given his/her first-order belief that E will play U E and 
his/her second-order belief that E believes that s/he will play (e,F), obtains ideal 
utility 0 for SS.  In fact, against a player E who unfairly plays UE, entering and 
playing “fair” by (e,F) gives the worst T value, which is equal to 0 with respect the 
best possible alternative of “staying out” by ¬e, which gives a T value equal to 1. 
Recall that a single conformity index equal to 0 entails that ideal utility is nil.  
•  Player SS’s strategy (e,U), given his/her first-order belief that E will play F E, and 
his/her second-order belief that E believes that s/he will play (e,U), obtains ideal 
utility 0 for SS. In fact, against a player E who plays “fair” by FE, responding with 
(e,U) means selecting the worst T value, which is equal to 0, with respect to the 
better alternative of responding fairly by (e,F), with T value 8.  
•  Player SS’s strategy (e,U), given his/her first-order belief that E will play UE and 
his/her second-order belief that E believes s/he will play (e,U), gives ideal utility 0 
to SS. In fact this choice entails “collusion” with the worst T value, eq ual to 0,  
                                                                                                                                               
12 See Appendix I for a complete application of the calculation method.    29 
whereas responding by “staying out” would give a better T of value 1, which is also 
the best given player E’s choice. 
•  Player SS’s strategy (¬e), given his/her first-order belief that E will play UE and 
his/her second-order belief that E believes that s/he will play (¬e), gives SS ideal 
utility λ. In fact, responding by (¬e) to E who plays U maximizes the T value, so 
that player SS’s deviation is 0. At the same time, given that player SS “stays out”, 
player E cannot do any better in order to maximize T than choose one or other 
(indifferently) of its two strategies UE or F E, since both of which give a T value 
equal to 1, and both of which have a deviation index 0. However, if E chooses FE, 
choosing (¬e) would no longer induce a conformity index 1, because SS in this case 
could maximize T by choosing (e,F).  
•  Player SS’s strategy (¬e), given his/her first-order belief that E will play FE and 
his/her second-order belief that E believes that s/he will play (¬e), obtains ideal 
utility  1/8λ.  In  this  case,  given  that  E  plays  “fairly”  by  FE,  player  SS do e s n o t  
maximize the T value by “staying out”. However, nor does s/he minimize it, since 
the worst T value equal to 0 would be reached if s/he played unfairly (e,U). Player 
SS t h u s  s c o r e s  a  h i g h  d e v i a t i o n  i n d e x  - 7 / 8 ,  a n d  h e n c e  h i s / h e r  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  
conditional conformity index is low, that is, 1/8. On the other hand, player E, who 
believes that player SS stays out, cannot do any better in order to enhance the T 
value than playing one or other (indifferently) of its strategies, FE or UE. Thus by 
playing F it obtain its maximum T value conditional on the (¬e) choice by SS. So the 
E’s expected reciprocal conformity index is 1, which combined with 1/8 allows only 
an ideal utility 1/8λ  to enter player SS’s overall payoff for this state.  
To sum up, the only way for SS to be fully conformist is to ‘enter’ and choose ‘fair’ if 
s/he predicts that also E plays ‘fair’, but to stay out otherwise. This latter behaviour is 
an important consequence of the conformist preference model: staying out of an unfair 
cooperative relation can induce the relative best level of conformity if the other player’s 
‘cooperative’ choice is such that acceding to such a proposal of unfair cooperation or 
collusion  would  induce  a  lower  level  of  implementation  of  the  principle  T.  Thus 
accepting  whatever  level  of  cooperation  or  collusion,  if  it  is  unfair  in  terms  of  the 
principle T, is not supported by conformist preferences. On the contrary, a “principled” 
refusal to interact can be supported by conformist preferences, which translates into an   30 
endogenous psychological incentive to punish the other party’s unfair choices. On the 
other hand, by ‘staying out’ when E chooses ‘fair’, the strong stakeholder SS permits 
only poor implementation of the principle. Finally, compliance would be nil not only if 
SS colludes, but also if s/he acquiesces with E’s opportunism by candidly choosing ‘fair’ 
when E is getting around its ‘pure’ intention by playing UE to appropriate the entire 
surplus.  
Thus far, things have been considered from SS’s perspective. Note, however, that 
player E’s index of conformity and its index of expected reciprocal conformity about 
player SS are derived by combining the same strategies described above. For example, 
E’s index of conditional conformity  ) , ( 1
1
E E E b f σ +  is based on the identical strategic 




1 Ss Ss E b b f + as seen in the eyes of player SS since the first-order beliefs of player SS 
consist of player E’s strategies, and his/her second-order beliefs about player E’s beliefs 
equal player E’s beliefs about player SS’s strategies. Then the two indexes must have 
the same valuesituations and payoffs, considered according to player E’s or player 
SS’s  beliefs  of  first  and  second  order  predicting  such  combinations  are  perfectly 
symmetrical for the strategies pairs (e,F;FE), (e,F;UE), (e,U;FE) and (e,U;UE). Of course, 
player E does not have move e, but it is ineffectual with respect to the symmetry of the 
situation  that  occurs  after  player  SS’s  ‘entrance’.  Then  E’s  indexes  of  conditional 
conformity and expected reciprocal conformity must be respectively identical to those 
just  considered  for  SS;  hence  also  the  ideal  payoffs  must  be  the  same.  The  only 
situations left to consider are those that cannot be symmetrical between players E and 
SS,  namely  (¬e,F),  (¬e,U)  –  i.e.  situations  where  E’s f i r s t - o r d e r  b e l i e f  p r e d i c t s  t h a t  
player SS will choose (¬e) while E’s second-order belief is that SS believes that it will 
choose either F or U. In these cases 
•  Player E’s strategy FE, given his/her first-order belief that SS will play ¬e and its 
second-order beliefs that SS believes that E will play FE, obtains ideal utility equal to 
1/8λ.  In  fact,  when  E  predicts  that  SS w ill stay  o u t,  it c a n n o t d o  a ny  be tte r  to  
maximize the T value than choose whichever of its strategies FE or UE. However, 
what reduces overall conformity in this case is the expected reciprocal conformity of 
SS, which is at the poor level of 1/8 (consider that his/her best conformity index 
would be associated with playing (e,F), while the worst one would be given by   31 
playing (e,U)). The result is  λ × × 8/1 1,   w h i c h   i s   t h e   i d e a l   u t i l i t y   t h a t   e n t e r s   E ’ s  
payoff for this outcome. 
•  Player E’s strategy UE, given his/her the first-order belief that SS will play ¬e and 
his/her  second-order  belief  that  SS b e l i e v e s  t h a t  E  w i l l  c h o o s e  U E,  obtains  the 
highest ideal utility λ. In fact, also in this case player E is doing as much as possible 
to  maximize  the  T v a l u e ,  g i v e n  t h e  ¬e  choice  by  SS ( s i n c e  b y  s t a y i n g  o u t  S S 
frustrates any attempt by E to affect the result). But in this case this also applies to 
SS, who predicts that E will in fact  choose UE, and hence rightly chooses to stay 
out, which makes the T value equal to 1, whereas if s/he had ‘entered’, that value 
would have been only 0 (in the case of both bilateral or unilateral collusion) .  
To be noted in regard to these last two points is that, symmetrically with what we said 
concerning the motivational force of SS’s  decision to ‘stay out’, when SS is commonly 
predicted to play ¬e, the individual responsibility of player E concerning the level of 
principle  attainment  is  nullified.  E  cannot  do  anything  about  the  level  of  T,  which 
cannot deviate from the one determined by player SS’s decision. Since E cannot be 
responsible for any deviation from the level of T, conformity is intact and maximal 
whatever the choice of E (UE included). This may also be understood in the sense that, 
by staying out, SS prevents any deviation from conformity that might be attributable to a 
choice by player E, whose intentions cannot be relevant in terms of responsibility, as far 
as they are at all fancyfull (E knows that, whatever its virtual choice, the game is over 
due to ¬e) and ineffective with respect to the game’s outcome. In any modified TG, 
such as the one under consideration, ¬e entails that the game ends before E’s decision 
node has even been reached. However, the conformity index is not a measure of a 
player’s counter-factual intentions, but only a measure of the factual deviation due to 
his/her decision from the best reachable level in terms of a given standard, conditional 
on the other players’ behaviour. It takes the dictum “ought implies can” quite seriously, 
and in this case player E cannot be considered responsible for any deviation from the 
given level of conformity with the principle T set by player SS. A different conclusion 
would be admissible if E assigned a positive probability to SS not being truly playing 
¬e. But this hypothesis is not admitted under the psychological games assumption that 
beliefs  are  internally  consistent  with  their  psychological  equilibria  and  are  common 
knowledge among the players. Hence it is admissible for conformity indexes in these   32 
cases to assign a zero deviation to any choice by player E and hence full conformity 
with player E’s choices. However, the case of player SS is quite different. When player 
SS predicts that player E will choose UE at his/her decision node either because its plans 
to collude or because its already knows that SS will stay out and hence feels relieved of 
any decisional responsibility toward T, then s/he is fully responsible for prevention of 
the possible effect of the predicted decision by E on T attainment. Hence, in order to 
conform  with  the  principle,  s/he  must  play  ¬e.  This  is  reflected  in  the  best  SS 
conditional conformity index (or in the best expected reciprocal conformity index, as 
seen in the eyes of player E), which is equal to 1 for that choice by player SS.  
To sum up, in correspondence to each combination of strategies (states of the game) 
conditioned  on  a  system  of  consistent  first-  and  second-order  beliefs  (i.e.  beliefs 
predicting exactly the state of the game under consideration), for every player we can 
single  out  the  values  of  the  conformist  component  of  his/her  utility  function  by 
computing the relevant combination of both the conformity indexes of a player.  
Before  continuing  with  discussion  of  the  psychological  equilibria  resulting  from 
integration  of  material  payoffs  with  ideal  utilities  deriving  from  conformists 
preferences, we give some intuitive substance as to why we consider the possibility that 
a firm may have a positive psychological payoff from applying an ethical principle of 
cooperation with all its stakeholders. Here our approach is closely linked with Aoki’s 
notion of corporate social capital (Aoki 2010, infra): ‘Corporate social capital may not 
be immediately cashed in, but it may be enjoyed by various corporate stakeholders in 
non-pecuniary manner, e.g., the pride of employees working for a socially reputable 
corporation,  satisfactions  of  environmentally-conscious  stockholders  from  owning 
‘green’ stocks, amenities of citizens living in clean local community and the like.’ λ E 
may be interpreted as the psychological payoff obtained by those with residual control 
rights (the owner or the top management in case of public companies), who may have 
conformist preferences and may obtain a positive psychological payoff from adopting 
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3.4  Psychological Equilibria in the PG 
Given the different values of ideal utility deriving from conformist preferences, the 
normal form of the psychological game with conformist preferences is shown in Figure 
6.  
Figure 6 Normal form of the PG game played  by SS and E 






e, F  2+λ Ss, 2+λ E, (2)  2, 4, (0) 
e, U  4, 2, (0)  3, 3, (0) 
¬ e  1+1/8λ Ss,1+1/8λ E, (1)  1+λSs, 1+λ E, (1) 
 
The  generalized form of this game under the assumption that payoffs satisfy the 
conditions d >c > b > a, is depicted in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Normal form of the PG game played  by SS and E – generalized form 






e,F  b+λ Ss, b+λ E, (b)  b, d, (0) 
e, U  d, b, (0)  c, c, (0) 
¬ e  a+kλ Ss, a+kλ E, (a)  a+λ Ss, a+λ E, (a) 
       Where 0k1 
 
It is evident from inspection of the psychological payoffs that, in general, if λ E and 
λ Ss a r e  b o t h  > d  − b  a n d  λ Ss>c  − a  ( w i t h  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  p a y o f f s  
parameters with which we have worked thus far, however, both conditions collapse to   34 
λ>2),  there  are  three  Nash  psychological  equilibria  under  conformist  preferences: 
(e,U;UE), (e,F;FE) and (¬e;UE). Most interesting are the equilibrium strategy profiles 
(e,F;FE) and (¬e;UE). Each of these must be understood as being contingent on the 
respectively appropriate system of mutually consistent beliefs of first and higher order. 
In regard to the former, player SS must be believed to be playing (e,F) and player E 
must be believed to be playing FE, while both of them must believe that the other has 
exactly these beliefs (and the consistent beliefs about beliefs). When these conditions 
are satisfied, the conformist payoffs reported in the upper left cell of the normal form 
game  in  Figure  6  are  effective  (because  they  depend o n  i n d e x e s  o f  c o n f o r m i t y  
contingent on exactly these beliefs) so that if λ E and λ Ss are both >d − b, the players’ 
mutual best responses are (e,F) and F. This means that both players have a desire to 
conform with their ideal principle of justice sufficient for them to prefer forgoing a 
material self-interested benefit achievable through a  c o llu siv e  ag r e e men t in  o r d er  to  
ensure fair treatment of the dummy player. 
Because of the existence of the second equilibrium, SS must be believed to stay out 
and E must be believed to play UE, while both of them must believe that these beliefs 
are also held by the counterparty and that they know what the other believes. When 
these beliefs are satisfied, the psychological conformist payoffs reported in the bottom 
right cell of Figure 6 are effective, so that ¬e is SS’s best response to E’s strategy UE 
(which in turn is its best response to ¬e). Note that the condition for the existence of 
this second equilibrium is   λ Ss>c − a , which is not required for λ E. This is required 
only of player SS since the decision to stay out of the cooperative relation with E is his 
or  hers  alone.  Intuitively,  this  implies  that,  by  trading-off  conformist  utility  with 
material payoffs, SS prefers to boycott E more than collude with him/her. Essentially, 
the ‘sanction strategy’ of strong stakeholders, which have a key role in inducing the 
firm to be ‘fair’ with weak stakeholders by respecting the CSR principles, does not 
require  any  condition  on  the  firm’s  psychological  payoffs  which  may  be  0. 
Consequently,  even  firms  which  are  not  intrinsically  motivated  by  cognitive  social 
capital,  if  they  agree  on  CSR  principles  in  order  to  induce  their  stakeholders  to 
undertake optimal investments, may suffer be sanctioned by strong stakeholders (if the 
value of λ Ss is high enough) and may be induced to cooperate with weak stakeholders.    35 
Finally, a further psychological equilibrium is the old Nash equilibrium (e,U;U E), 
which materialises when the previous conditions on beliefs systems are not fulfilled 
even if the conditions on λ E and λ Ss are satisfied. That is, notwithstanding the absolute 
potential  of  the  disposition  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  justice,  this 
equilibrium emerges when mutual confidence in reciprocal effective conformity breaks 
down. This amounts to a beliefs system such that player E neither believes that SS is 
effectively compliant with the principle, so that s/he would really play strategy (e,F) if E 
were to choose strategy FE, nor is confident that SS would really play strategy ¬e if it 
offered collusion by strategy UE. At the same time, SS neither believes that E will play 
FE when s/he plays (e,F) nor believes that player E is confident that s/he will really play 
¬e if E plays UE. Under these conditions of mistrust, an SS playing ¬e would act against 
the systems of mutually consistent beliefs that predict (e,U;UE) as the result, which is 
not admissible in terms of psychological equilibrium. In the absence of beliefs systems 
that justify playing one of the other two psychological equilibria, (e, U;UE) emerges as 
the only psychological equilibrium, even though it is based on just material payoff. 
 
4.  Cognitive  social  capital  and  the  endogenous  sustainability  of  cooperative 
networks of relations 
The  psychological  game  PG  played  by  E  and  SS r e v e a ls the  imp o r ta nc e  o f b o th  
cognitive social capital and of CSR principles in allowing the endogenous sustainability 
of cooperative relations between the firm and all its stakeholders that were considered 
as mere possibilities – far from being effective – in networks like  the one reported in 
Figure 3. In this section we set out the main result. A rigorous proof must wait for the 
next sections.  
4.1  Cognitive social capital as conformity disposition 
A high level of cognitive social capital in terms of disposition (λ) is a necessary, 
even if not sufficient, condition for obtaining structural social capital between the firm 
and all the stakeholders. If the conditions on the parameter λ are not satisfied, only the 
unfair  or  collusive  equilibrium  (e,U;UE)  can  emerge.  Referring  to  the  distinction 
between bridging and bonding social capital - ‘There may be high social capital within a 
group (‘bonding’ social capital) which helps members, but they may be excluded from 
other groups (they lack ‘bridging’ social capital.’ (Narayan 1999, p.3) - we may say that   36 
the collusive equilibrium is an example of bonding social capital (between the firm and 
the strong stakeholders), while the fair cooperative equilibrium between the firm and its 
strong stakeholders is an example of bridging social capital. Sufficiency conditions for 
bridging social capital include both dispositions and beliefs systems. Bonding social 
capital  obtains  whenever  the  disposition  to  conform w i t h  i m p a r t i a l  n o r m s  i s  
insufficiently strong or when, owing to contingent conditions, expectations of mutual 
distrust emerge concerning reciprocity in conforming  with  fair  and  impartial  norms, 
whereas players have consistent beliefs systems that allow them to predict collusion 
(which, moreover, must be a Nash equilibrium). This characterisation of bridging social 
capital  in  terms  of  equilibrium  conditions  shows  that,  even  though  some  of  its 
components may be objectively determined at the level of the biological or cultural 
heritage  of  a  given  category  of  individuals,  most  of  it  is  nevertheless  relative  and 
contingent  on  fragile  conditions  of  social  interaction  amongst  rational  individuals. 
Beliefs systems in particular exhibit this contingency, for there is no absolute reason for 
some of them to be completely discarded so as to ensure that only the ‘desired’ beliefs 
systems emerge to support good equilibria. In fact, how could we exclude a priori that a 
situation of mistrust may emerge even amongst people with the highest disposition to 
conform with social norms and ethical principles?  
4.2  What affects beliefs in the PG. The role of agreement  
As usual, multiple equilibria (especially multiple psychological equilibria) make any 
prediction about the effective solution of the game depend on the availability  of an 
equilibrium selection mechanism able to explain the formation of any given system of 
mutually consistent beliefs whereon equilibria are contingent. This is not a matter of 
brutally  biological  or  traditionally  determined  cultural  inheritance.  On  the  contrary, 
equilibrium selection depends on fragile cognitive mechanisms of belief formation, such 
as how individuals reasonably react to different choice contexts and how they learn 
from past interactions. Far from being able to uniquely answer this problem, conformist 
preference theory is not completely mute about it. Recourse to the ‘cognitive role’ of 
ethical norms and distributive justice principles helps give partial predictability to the 
emergence of the system of beliefs required for bridging social capital to be created and 
the corresponding fairness equilibrium to be implemented (see Sacconi 2010c, infra).   37 
Modelling  the  game  in  terms  of  conformist  preferences  entails  some  implicit 
assumptions. In particular, as already said, it amounts to assuming that, before this game 
is played, there must be a phase of pre-play communication (traditional game theory 
would rule it out as ‘cheap talk’, but we shall see that it is quite important in affecting 
the players’ preferences). In this phase, players adopt the cognitive perspective of an 
ideal game ‘under a veil of ignorance’ such that they are able to agree impartially on a 
norm or a principle of fairness which they deem relevant to the distribution of surpluses 
generated  in  interactions  like  the  one  involving  E  and  its  stakeholders.  The 
‘impartiality’ of this point of view consists in the fact that, with ignorance of who will 
take ex post whatever role in the game (be it the role of E or the role of whichever 
category of stakeholders), a (CSR) principle of fair division is ex ante agreed upon by 
anonymous players in order to establish how the real life division game will be played 
ex post. This may be seen as reasoning ‘as if’ the players were involved in a fictitious 
bargaining game ‘under the veil of ignorance’. But alternatively it may also be seen as 
simply a cognitive process of reasoning whereby players are detached from the personal 
perspective and their interests in the concrete situation, and simply recognize that the 
situation  (the  game)  they  are  going  to  play  has  to  be  categorized  as  one  element 
pertaining to a more general class of situations where a given principle or social norm of 
fairness is normally applied. Put differently, the situation exhibits to a significant degree 
the pattern or the silhouette of a category –or fuzzy membership of a set – which is 
normally  understood  as  the  domain  of  application  of a  g i v e n  p r i n c i p l e  o r  n o r m  o f  
justice.
13  
What  is  distinctive  of  this  pre-play  communication  stage  is  that  in  one  way  or 
another  it  operates  as  a  framing  effect o n  b o t h  p l a y e r s ’  m o t i v a t i o n s  a n d  b e l i e f s .  
According to the motivational point of view, framing a situation as one involving a fair 
agreement on a principle of justice activates a motivational drive (what we may call a 
disposition to act in conformity with a mutually agreed principle) able to produce a 
specific behaviour or the ‘desire’ to be just. The intensity of this ‘desire’, or the causal 
                                                 
13 These are just two different w ays to approach the same point, however. In fact players could not 
categorize the situation as one whereon an impartial principle of justice normally applies if in some sense 
they would not envision it as if they were ‘under a veil of ignorance’. A situation wherein an individual 
performs a format of reasoning such that independently of the consideration of his/her individual identity 
s/he is capable of agreeing on a principle of equitable distribution  with other individuals supposedly 
similarly detached from the urgency of their material claims, is quite similar to the cognitive process 
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force  of  this  disposition  seen  as  a  preference  (which  is  a  sort  of  passe-partout f o r  
intending whatever motive to act) is what the model captures with the parameter λ. 
Hence, it is because in a pre-play communication phase the situation has been assessed 
in terms of an impartial agreement or according to a commonly shared  principle that in 
the “real life” game players may frame the situation so that they feel the motivational 
force to act in accordance with it “up to level” λ.  
From  the  cognitive  point  of  view,  framing  the  situation  as  one  of  impartial 
agreement, or simply as an exemplar of a wider category to which a general abstract 
principle of impartial treatment applies, affects the players’ beliefs. When a situation is 
recognized  as  belonging  to  an  abstract  category  requiring  impartial  treatment,  the 
individual  reasoner  proceeds  by  default t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  r e a s o n  o r  
evidence for not believing that both him/herself and the counterparts will envisage the 
situation in the same way. The abstract norm or principle (in our case the agreed CSR 
principle) defines a mental model of the rational agent as a typical agent that agrees on a 
principle and hence is (until proof to the contrary) committed to it, or as an agent who 
behaves as normally observed within a category of cases subsumed within the domain 
of a norm or principle. ‘People that voluntarily agree on a principle or who understand 
this situation as belonging to a category identified by the validity of a norm, normally 
behave like that…’ – this defines a normative mental model of agent that the individual 
reasoner  endorses  under  the  framing  effect  of  what  we  called  the  pre-play 
communication phase (see Sacconi and Faillo 2010).  
There is no definitive proof that all agents will actually act according to this model. 
Rather, it is the simplest model of agent that follows from the fact that the situation has 
been framed as a situation of impartial agreement or a case belonging to a general class 
identified by a norm of justice. It might be said that if one freely agrees to a principle, 
one  expresses  the  plan  or  the  intention  of  acting  according  to  the  provisos  of  the 
agreement itself. Hence, until proof to the contrary, one may expect the rational agent to 
act ‘normally’ according to his/her free agreement. If one categorizes a situation as a 
case in a class subsumed under the domain of an abstract norm, the norm defines how 
people normally act within the category (or must act to stay in it) until proof to the 
contrary. Hence, one has a mental model of how people normally behave (or normally 
                                                                                                                                               
abstract principle of justice such that the case will be treated according to the impartiality criteria inherent 
to the principle.   39 
should behave to satisfy the premise of an impartial agreement or consistency with the 
normative  statement  of  a  norm)  under  the  current  categorization,  until  proof  to  the 
contrary.  
Admittedly,  all  these  are  just  default i n f e r e n c e s ,  v a l i d  u n d e r  caveats s u c h  a s  
‘normally’, ‘until proof to the contrary’ , ‘not contrary to what we already know’ etc. 
But  they  are  nevertheless  perfectly  legitimate  within  their  limits.  If  these  are  the 
stereotypes of a rational agent under the current framing of the situation, they are also 
the mental models that ‘come to the agent’s mind’ when s/he tries to decide rationally, 
those that s/he takes for granted or as provisionally valid to plan his/her action. There is 
no conclusive reason for doing this except that these constitute the model of the rational 
agent that comes to his/her mind under the current framing effect.  
Now imagine that the same agent is asked to forecast the behaviour of other agents 
(for example the second player in the real life game). In the absence of contradictory 
information or evidence to the contrary, by default s/he will simulate the other agents’ 
reasoning  and  behaviour  by  applying  the  same  mental m o d e l  u s e d  t o  p r o v i s i o n a l l y  
define his/her own plan or conduct. The rational basis for this replication has the same 
fragile but nonetheless intelligible basis as before: the simplest way to forecast other 
agents’ behaviour, as long as there is no evidence or proof to the contrary, is to deduce 
their behaviour from the best mental model of an agent inferred from the frame of the 
situation. ‘Assuming that the situation has been understood as one of impartial and 
generally  acceptable  agreement,  or  one  normally  categorised  as  the  domain  of 
application of a neutral norm, given that I need to work out a forecast of other agents, I 
do not find any reason not to apply to these other agents the same mental model that 
seems valid for myself as it is consistent with a norm  which  is  independent  of  any 
characteristics that make me different from any other’. As long as there is no evidence 
that  other  players  do  not  participate  in  the  same  impartial  agreement  or  do  not 
categorize the current situation in like manner, by default we conclude that the same 
model  of  agent  that  came  to  our  mind  to  define  our  action  is  also  valid  for 
symmetrically forecasting other agent’s decisions and behaviours.  
Given  the  mental  model  just  described,  if  players  participate  in  the  pre-play 
communication stage (the agreement on CSR principles) their first-order beliefs in the 
psychological game consist of the mutual prediction that strategy choices are (e,F) and 
(F), and their mutual second-order beliefs are hence consistent with these predictions 
about choices.    40 
4.3  Cognitive social capital and ‘modified’ MG trigger strategies 
The analysis of belief formation resulting from the pre-play communication phase 
provides a sound and workable starting point for our model, but no more than that. In 
fact it works only in a one-shot game, where there is no previous experience and no 
evidence can be uncovered that contradicts the mental model derived from the ideal 
choice  or  the  abstraction  and  categorisation  process  carried  out  at  the  pre-play 
communication stage. However, when the game is repeatedly played, observations of 
previous  effective  behaviours  necessarily  influence b e l i e f s  a b o u t  w h a t  s t r a t e g y  t h e  
counterpart is effectively playing.  
Here we make our first basic assumption about the dependence of player SS’s beliefs 
and  behaviours  in  our  psychological  game  (the  PG)  on  what  s/he  learns  from  the 
behaviours of player E in the other games in which it participates through the relational 
network considered in Figure 3. We call all of them PDEj in order to indicate that they 
are Prisoner’s Dilemmas played by E in relation to player SWj = j. We assume that  
A1) If SS learns that player E defects at time t in a PDEj, s/he understands that E is 
not ‘really’ playing the strategy F in the PG from that stage onwards.  
In fact what has been saved and entitled to SWj in the solution of the component game of 
division of the surplus PG has not been used to remunerate players SWj equitably by 
cooperating with them. Thus, at stage t+1, SS will predict that player E is not playing 
‘fair’ in the current repetition of PG. This signifies that the condition for the emergence 
of the ‘no entry’ psychological equilibrium has been activated (obviously, the ‘no entry’ 
decision depends also on the value of λ). Of course, this point is particularly important 
in relation to the strategy ¬e that is what in our model takes the place of the punishment 
stage strategy discussed in section 3.4, and the psychological equilibrium involving ¬e 
seems to be what we needed to show that implementing the punishment phase in player 
SS’s strategy is compatible with SS’s (conformist) incentives. To guarantee this result, 
however, we need not only to show that, when s/he learns about a defection against 
weak stakeholders, SS believes that E will choose UE in PG at t+1. We also need to 
show that E predicts that SS will not enter at time t+1. The ‘no entry’ equilibrium is 
contingent on this reciprocal beliefs system.  
Assumption A1 requires a caveat: SS does not understand that E is not really playing 
the Fair strategy FE in the PG when it defects for the first time in the PDs with weak   41 
stakeholders, in case this is required by implementation of E’s MG trigger strategy. It 
seems in fact likely that E does not lose his/her trustworthiness in the eyes of SS if s/he 
knows that E is required to defect by  compliance with a MG trigger strategy itself 
intended to support cooperation throughout the network. Nevertheless, this forgiveness 
cannot last for more than one period because also player SS’s sanctions based on how 
s/he assesses player E’s behaviour are needed in order to provide player E with the 
appropriate  incentive  not  to  take  advantage  of  its  relation  with  SS  to  exploit  weak 
stakeholders.  
To suppose that E realizes that SS will not enter at t+1 after it has defected against 
weak stakeholders is quite intuitive in a context where players have first agreed on a 
fairness norm and have also conformed with it, so that player E knows that SS has 
effective conformist preferences encapsulating a desire to be consistent with a shared 
norm of fairness. However, having a strong disposition to conformity is not enough if 
the relevant beliefs do not exist as well. This hypothesis must be rigorously justified, for 
the emergence of a psychological equilibrium in a given stage game depends strictly on 
the players’ reciprocally consistent beliefs. Here we introduce our second assumption 
concerning the link between the equilibria of the game PG and how other games are 
played by different players throughout the network. We assume that SS plays each PG 
stage game by following a version of the multilateral grim (=MG) trigger strategy.    
A2) SS at first plays (e,F), but after some stage t s/he plays ¬e if s/he learns from a 
defection occurring at stage t-1 in a PDEj – which E plays with any SWj –  that E 
is not going to play Fair in the current PG (under the same caveat valid for 
assumption A1). 
The strategy adopted by SS to play his/her repeated game as a function of E’s past 
behaviour is common knowledge in the network. This entails that once, at whatever 
stage  t i n  a  r e p e a t e d  g a m e  P D Ej,  p l a y e r  E  c h o o s e s  t o  d e f e c t ,  i t  a l s o  o b t a i n s  t h e  
information that player SS will play ¬e in the following stage t+1 of the PG. But this is 
exactly the basis for the E’s belief that at t+1 SS will play ¬e, and for SS’s second-order 
beliefs  that  E    predicts  that  s/he  will  stay  out  at s t a g e  t+1 –  i . e .  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
emergence of  the ‘no entry’  psychological equilibrium at t+1.   
The caveat to A1 is again relevant. Also E’s strategy is common knowledge, so that 
SS knows whether E will adopt a MG trigger strategy such that if at t-1 a defection 
occurs in the network, then player E will play ‘defection’ in the PDEj at the stage t. But   42 
it is not required by assumption A1 that player SS immediately anticipates that player E 
is not going to play consistently with the fair strategy at stage t. This understanding can 
be delayed until after E’s defection effectively occurs, so that player SS, given his/her 
state of information and repeated strategy, must start to play ¬e at stage t+1. Player SS 
believes that E predicts that s/he will change her choice at t+1 and also that s/he realizes 
that E defected at t. At the same time, E predicts that SS will change his/her strategy at 
t+1 a n d  a l s o  b e l i e v e s  t h a t  s / h e  r e a l i z e s  t h a t  E ’ s  c h a n ge  of  strategy  occurred  at  t. 
Mutually consistency of beliefs is satisfied in order to allow the emergence of the ‘no 
entry’  equilibrium profile at t+1. 
As a consequence, we are not assuming that SS should implement the MG trigger 
strategy as a rule follower without having the proper psychological incentive to do so 
(as noted in sub-sec. 2.2.3). On the contrary, the sanctioning strategy adopted at the t+1 
stage  in  game  PG  has  a  perfectly  endogenous  explanation.  The  adoption  of  the 
multilateral grim trigger strategy is perfectly consistent with the equilibrium behaviour 
that SS implements in the stage-game in which the strategy requires him/her to sanction 
E.  We  may  say  that  player  SS p l a y s  ¬e  because s / h e  i s  b e l i e v e d  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  
multilateral grim trigger strategy as a function of E’s behaviour, but the content of this 
belief is now perfectly consistent with the psychological equilibrium behaviour that s/he 
implements in the game.  
In conclusion, although we have not still precisely worked out the relation between 
what happens in a single PG stage-game and the strategies played in the repeated games 
that take place throughout the network, we have laid the bases for answering the central 
question: why should SS carry out his/her threat to punish E if the latter had failed to 
cooperate with some SWj? Our answer is that, under the proper beliefs about SS, s/he is 
ready to act as a conformist agent also if E continues not to conform with the agreed 
norms. Hence punishing player E by ‘staying out’ in the current stage game PG, is 
perfectly in line with player SS’s psychological incentive (when  λ  is high enough to 
counterbalance  the  material  payoff).  By  anticipating  SS’s  behaviour,  given  our 
assumption  (on  belief  formation  and  value  of  λ
14),  the  firm  E  will  also  have  the 
                                                 
14 W h e n  w e  m o v e  f r o m  t h e  o n e - s h o t  g a m e  t o  t h e  i t e r a t e d  interactions  between  the  firm  and  its 
stakeholders, the possibility that λ  could endogenously change with the games’ result may be taken into 
account.  It  could  be  assumed,  for  example,  that  λ  o f  S S a n d  E  i n c r e a s e s  a t  e a c h  s t a g e  w h e n  t h e y  
experience conformity indices equal to 1 or 1-ε. Our analysis does not consider this possibility, which 
could represent an extension of our model.   43 
incentive to avoid opportunistic behaviour against weak stakeholders so as to prevent 
SS’s retaliation.  
This suggests (even if a rigorous proof must wait until the next two sections) that 
cognitive social capital, as understood here in terms of conformist preferences and the 
related  systems  of  consistent  beliefs,  is  at  the  very  root  of  the  possibility  to  make 
cooperation sustainable in a relational network of repeated games, which is what we 
typically  mean  by  the  term  ‘structural  social  capital’  seen  as  a  set  of  effective 
cooperative relations based on trust. 
 
5.  Strategies and beliefs formation in the psychological game as a function of 
repeated playing of games in the relational network  
 
The aim of this section is to provide a clear link between the one-shot psychological 
game (PG) played by E (the firm) and SS, discussed in section 3, and the framework of 
network analysis reported at the beginning of section 2. Hence, here we consider the PG 
as a stage-game within the repeated playing of the games (not only repeated PG but also 
other games) in which players are involved throughout the network. Our aim is to adapt 
the MG trigger strategy to the roles performed by E and SS in the repeated playing of 
games in the network: that is, its specification in consideration of the peculiar game in 
which  players  SS a n d  E  a r e  i n v o l v e d  –  t h e  r e p e a t e d  P G  . W e  u s e  t h e  a nalytical 
framework introduced in section 2.1 and we refer to the notion of sustainability of a 
relational non-mutual network as set out in L&S (2009). We introduce a variation of the 
MG trigger strategy that will account for how this strategy is specified with reference to 
the  manner  in  which  the  repeated  PG  must  be  played  in  function  of  behaviours 
maintained in games nested in each other throughout the network so that it can support 
cooperation in all these repeated games.  
To this end, we first need to identify the strategy profile of a player i involved in the 
network described in Figure 3, which comprises players E, SS, SW1, SW2 and agents 3, 4 
and 5, that at each stage participate in playing the repeated games (normally, but for SS 
and E, two adjacent games) in the network. It should be borne in mind that SS plays 
only  an  iterated  PG  with  E,  while  all  the  other  agents  play  two  iterated  Prisoners’ 
Dilemmas  with  adjacent  agents  belonging  to  the  network.  As  a  consequence,  only 
player E is involved in three games (the PG and two PDs) at each stage. 
We define 
t h
 as a history of all the repeated games played by the agents belonging to 
the network. 
t h  is one of the possible sequences of moves available to players until the   44 
period t. The set of all the possible histories 
t h  is termed 
t H . Player i’s strategy is 
defined as a function that, at any time t, associates with each history 
t t H h ∈  the moves 
that will be selected by player i from t+1 onwards: 





i A H f s t ∀ .  
Note that the strategies of an agent i who plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in our 
network do not only depend on the decisions made by i and the players who play the 
game with him/her. They are also determined by the moves made by the other agents in 
the network, even though they are not directly connected with i. In fact, the MG trigger 
strategy, which we assume to characterize the way in which these games are played, 
implies  that  every  player  i  N ∈ starts  cooperating  with  his/her  neighbours,  and 
continues to cooperate as long as s/he observes that all the other players cooperate. But 
s/he  stops  cooperating  if  s/he  observes  that  someone,  somewhere  in  the  network, 
defects. Moreover, the strategies of the firm E and of the SS also depend on the history 
that  characterizes  the  psychological  game  in  which  they  are  involved  and  which  is 
different from the PDs played in the rest of the network. This amounts to saying that 
both the enterprise’s and the strong stakeholder’s strategies in the psychological game 
are a function of the Cartesian product of the histories which come about both in the 
psychological game and in all the repeated prisoner’s dilemmas: 
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PD H 1 i s  t h e  s e t  o f  a l l  t h e  p o s s i b l e  h i s t o r i e s  w h i c h  m a y  h y p o t h e t i c a l l y  
characterize the PD1 - i.e. the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma between the firm and the 
first agent connected with it in the network. In regard to the network depicted in Figure 
3, for example, PD1 is the game between E and SW1 (more specifically, we will call this 
game PDE1) and PD2 is the game between E and SW2 (PDE2). To simplify the notation, 
hereafter E’s strategies in these PDEj will be CEj and DEj respectively for ‘cooperation’ 
and ‘defection’ where j = SWj. 
To understand the effect of all the network’s relationships on the PG played by E and 
SS we start from the strategies of E and SS in particular by investigating the process that 
drives the belief formation of these two agents in the PG. SS’s and E’s beliefs in the PG 
are a function of the histories characterizing both the psychological game PG and all the 
PDs.  
   45 
5.1.  The strong stakeholder’s beliefs and strategy 
 
Player SS’s beliefs about the firm E’s behaviour in the PG at time t depend both on 
the past behaviour of E in the repeated PG and on the behaviour of E in the repeated 
Prisoner’s Dilemmas in which it is involved (in our example: PD E1   and PDE2). The 
latter, because of the MG trigger strategy, is also related to all the oth er Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas  played  in  the  network.  Essentially,  SS  forms  his/her  belief  about  E’s 
behaviour in the PG by looking at the moves made by E in the previous periods, both in 
the PG and in the PDEj. In particular, before giving more technical formalization, we 
assume that the belief formation of SS is based on the following considerations: 
1.  the initial belief of SS is that the firm will play FE in the PG, in consideration of 
the rational agreement on the CSR principle T subscribed to by the firm (section 
4.2); 
2.  if at any time E does not play F in the PG, thereafter the trust of SS in the ‘fair’ 
behaviour of E goes to zero (sufficient condition); 
3.  SS’s belief also depends on the moves made by E in the repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas that it plays with weak stakeholders. If the firm E always cooperates 
with all its weak stakeholders (i.e. it plays CEj
 ∀j), then the trust of SS in the fair 
behaviour FE of E remains unchanged. If at any time E defects in one repetition 
of a Prisoner’s Dilemma that it plays with a SWj, his/her belief changes.  
4.  However  SS’s  trust  in  E  does  not  change  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that 
somewhere in the network a player different from E has defected and that, owing 
to player’s E adoption of the MG trigger strategy, E must start punishing the SWj  
(i.e. E’s defection is aimed at punishing some other defections occurring in the 
network).  The  simple  fact  that  E  adopts  its  MG  trigger  strategy  keeps  it 
trustworthy,  because  it  complies  with  a  commitment  intended  to  prevent 
opportunistic behaviour in the network.  
The idea is that E is not trustworthy as a fair player in the PG in two cases (besides 
the fact that it has evidently started to play unfairly in the PG):  
a)  Either  if  E  is  the  first  player  that  defects  against  a  weak  stakeholder  in  a 
repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemmas it plays with them – in fact cooperation in   46 
PG is aimed at producing positive output for weak stakeholders, for this reason 
the defection against them in the following PDs can be reasonably associated 
with a ‘not fair’ behaviour in the psychological game.  
b)  Or if it does not punish the defection of other agents by avoiding to implement 
the MG trigger strategy – which is exactly aimed at guarantee the cooperation in 
the network by resort to its implicit treat of punishment.  
For this reason, SS’s belief at time t depends (a) on E’s move at time t-1 in the PG; 
(b) on E’s moves in the PDEj at time t-1 (in particular if it defects or not); (c) on the 
moves of all the players involved in the PDs at time t-1 and t-2. In fact: (c.1) if some 
agent other than E defects at time t-1, E keeps its trustworthiness at time t; (c.2) if some 
agent defects at time t-2, and if at t-1 E does not implement its part in the MG trigger 
strategy, this  move will be considered not consistent with E’s fairness, so that it will 
turn E into an untrustworthy player thereafter. 
To give a formal description, SS’s beliefs concerning E’s behaviour in the PG are 
settled according to the following rules (where for the purposes of this section 
t
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In particular, the probabilities that E is going to play FE or UE in the PG according to 
player SS’s first-order belief are: 
•  Ss b (FE) = 1 at time t if at time t-1 E plays (FE , CEj) and SS plays (e,F) in the PG 
and if  
 
a)   at time t-2 ∀k, ∀i k R ∈ : Cki  
or 
b)  at time t-1 ∃k ≠ E, ∃i k R ∈ : Dki  
 
 
•    Ss b (FE) = 0 at time t, if at time t-1 in the PG E plays UE or SS plays (¬e); 
and if 
a)  at time t-2 ∃k ≠ E, ∃i k R ∈ s.t. Dki and at time t-1 E plays (FE, CEj)  
or 
b) at time t-1 ∃k = E, ∃i k R ∈ s.t. Dki    47 
 
Note that  Ss b  (FE) = 1 is compatible with the case that having learnt that at time t-1 ∃k ≠ 
E, ∃i k R ∈ : Dki, the player E at time t is reacting to such information by playing (FE, 
DEj). That is, SS does not infer from condition 1.b) that player E will play (FE, DEj) at t. 
Given these hypotheses, the following repeated strategy by player SS is consistent, 
and we assume that it is played by SS 
 
1.  SS starts by playing (e,F) at time t=1 
2.  ∀t >1, SS continues playing (e,F) if  
a) at time t-1 in PG E plays FE and SS plays (e, F) 
and if 
b) at time t-1 E plays CEj in PDEj ∀j E R ∈  and at time t-2 ∀k and ∀i k R ∈ : Cki
  
or  
c) at t-1 E plays CEj in PDEj and at the same time t-1, ∃k ≠ E, ∃i k R ∈ , s.t. Dki  
3.  reverts to ¬e forever otherwise 
where j = 1,2 are the weak stakeholders SWj linked to E; i =1,...,m are agents that may 
have relations with a generic agent in the network (normally different from E); i k R ∈ are 
the agents included in agent k’s set of relations ; k =1,...,s are agents in the network that 
have a set of relations;  k R  is the set of relations that characterizes agent k. 
Note again that the strategy of player SS is compatible with the hypothesis that at 
time t, when s/he continues to play (e,F), player E reverts to (FE, DEj) if and only if at 
time  t-1,  ∃k  ≠ E ,  ∃i k R ∈ ,  s.t.  Dki.  In  other  words,  player  SS d o e s  n o t  r e a c t  t o  t h e  
information that at t-1, ∃k ≠ E, ∃i k R ∈ , s.t. Dki by immediately reverting to a sectioning 
strategy ¬e. In order to do so, s/he waits for at least one period, wherein player E will 
revert to a sanctioning strategy DEj because of the defection that occurred in some other 
part of the network at the time immediately before.  
According to this strategy, at any t SS punishes E (which means that s/he does not 
enter into a relation with E and plays ¬e) if (a) E defects in the PG; (b) E fails to 
contribute to maintaining cooperation in the network by implementing the MG trigger 
strategy if someone anywhere in the network defects at an immediately previous time; 
(c) E defects in one of the PDEj at t-1. However, the player SS’s reported game strategy 
shows more forgiveness than the standard MG trigger strategy, which if information is 
received about a player defecting somewhere in the network immediately requires each   48 
player to punish its adjacent network agent as it is involved in a repeated game wherein 
s/he is also involved. On the contrary, in the case of player SS, his/her modified MG 
trigger strategy waits for one period before the punishment starts, giving player E the 
chance to show whether it is consistent with its MG trigger strategy (that is to start its 
punishment continuation strategy with respect to the SWj as a consequence of a breach 
of cooperation somewhere in the network). Thus player SS is ready to accept one-stage 
defection  by  player  E,  which  plays  (FE,DEj),  before  starting  the  sanctioning  part  of 
his/her repeated strategy. In fact, if E defects at time t as a consequence of someone’s 
else defection at time t-1, SS does not anticipate its defection and continues to play (e,F) 
at time t (i.e. s/he does not punish E at time t), but at time t+1 cooperation in the PG 
will have anyway stopped and SS will play ¬e. This happens even though E does not 
have  any  primitive  responsibility  for  the  occurrence  of  defections  in  the  Prisoner’s 
Dilemmas. In fact, were SS not punishing E at time t+1 the sanction power implicit in 
the MG trigger strategy could not be effective. To sum up, in order to have asanction 
power against E, the SS’s MG trigger strategy, does not allow playing (e,F) when E 
effectively defects with its weak stakeholders in the Prisoner’s Dilemmas, even though 
E’s defection is the consequence of implementation of its MG trigger strategy. But it is 
not  so  harsh  as  to  start  punishing  E  just  because  someone  else  in  the  network  has 
defected against any other agent.  
 
5.2  The Firm’s Beliefs and Strategy 
 
Player E’s beliefs are defined according to the following rules (where for the 
purposes of this section
t
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In  particular,  the  probability  that  SS i s  g o i n g  t o  p l a y  a n y  o f  h i s / h e r  P G  s t r a t e g y  
according to player’s E first-order beliefs is 
 
•  E b  (e,F) = 1 at time t, if at time t-1 in the PG SS plays (e,F) and E plays (FE)  
and if  
a)  at time t-1 ∀k, ∀i k R ∈ : Cki;  
or 
b)  at time t-1 ∃k≠E, ∃i k R ∈  s.t. Dki    49 
•  E b (¬e) = 1 at time t if at time t-1 in the PG SS plays ¬e or E plays (UE) 
or  
a)  at time t-1 ∃k = E, ∃i k R ∈ s.t. Dki  
or  
b)  E plays CEj at time t-1 and at time t-2 ∃k≠E, ∃i k R ∈  s.t. Dki 
•  E b  (U) = 1 at time t iff SS plays U at time t-1. 
Note that  E b  (e,F) = 1 does not exclude the possibility that having learnt at time t-1 that 
∃k≠E,  ∃i k R ∈  s . t .  D ki a t  t i m e  t p l a y e r  E  i s  i n  f a c t  p l a y i n g  ( F E,DEj),  and  hence  SS 
according  to  E  may  fail  to  predict  that  E  is  changing  its  strategy.  Given  these 
hypotheses on E’s beliefs, the definition of the E’s relevant strategy considers the role 
of E both in the PG and in PDEj. Hence we state that player E acts as follows: 
1.  E starts by playing (FE,CEj) at time t = 1 
 
2.   ∀t >1, E continues playing (FE,CEj), iff 
a)  at time t-1 in PG SS plays (e,F) and E plays FE 
and 
b)  at time t-1 ∀k, ∀i k R ∈ : Cki 
 
3.  E reverts to (UE,DEj) if at time t-1 in PG SS plays (¬e) or E plays UE   
4.  E reverts to (FE,DEj) if at time t-1 ∃k ≠ E, ∃i k R ∈ , s.t. Dki
 ; 
 
5.  At t >2, E reverts to (UE,DEj) if at time t-2 ∃k≠E, ∃i k R ∈ , s.t. Dki. 
We assume that E follows the MG trigger strategy with regard to all the players 
involved in the repeated PDs, i.e. it defects at time t if it knows that a defection has 
occurred anywhere in the network at time t-1. If E does not learn about defections, it 
continues to cooperate in the PDEj. With regard to the PG, E plays FE as long as SS plays 
(e,F), and no defection has occurred in the network, and until itself has played DEj in the 
PDEj at least once in order to start the sanctioning part of its strategy when someone 
defects in some of the PDs, but it reverts at any time t >1 to (UE,DEj) if it learns about SS 
playing ¬e or U – because it has no incentive to play cooperatively in the PDEj in the   50 
absence of the psychological payoff associated with high mutual compliance with the 
principle T in PG. It also reverts to (UE,DEj) when it is sanctioning any deviation from 
cooperation occurring in the network for at least two periods – since in the first period E 
starts sanctioning by playing (FE,DEj). 
Thus, if E starts to defect at time t in PDEj in order to punish agents who started to 
defect at time t-1, given the SS strategy already described, it knows that SS will still play 
(e,F) at time t because s/he does not want to prevent the firm’s defection aimed at 
implementing the MG trigger strateg. Hence, at this stage, player E plays (FE,DEj) and 
SS does not anticipate this defection. Nevertheless at time t+1, according to his/her 
strategy (see section 5.1), SS will play ¬e and E – having already defected at least once 
– will play (UE,DEj) on its own. Thereafter, E will continue to play (UE,DEj) given that 
SS plays ¬e. 
Note that if SS learns at time t-1 about a defection in the network by one or more 
agents other than E, s/he starts to play ¬e only at time t+1 even if E implements its MG 
trigger strategy already at time t by using (FE,DEj). But s/he also punishes E at time t+1 
if it does not play the MG trigger strategy at time t when a breach of cooperation has 
occurred at time t-1, so that at time t it has played (FE,CEj). On the other hand, player 
E’s modified MG trigger strategy is so conceived that it will start defecting after any 
information about an agent other than itself defecting in whatever part of the network by 
playing F in the PG but DEj in the consequent PDs. Given the delay in reaction to the 
same information by player SS  – or, to put it somewhat differently, given that SS does 
not react immediately to such information but only to vis a vis defection by E in their 
interaction, or in the subsequent PDEj after having played F in PG – player E may profit 
from one period of forgiveness in which it can reap a higher pay off than would be 
allowed in the case of immediate sanction by SS.  
5.3  How E and the SS play the repeated PG according to the modified MG 
trigger strategies 
 
The strategies and the beliefs discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2 define two modified 
versions  of  the  MG  trigger  strategy  by  specifying  how  players  E  and  SS w i l l  a c t  
according to such a multilateral harshly sanctioning strategy with respect to the repeated 
play of their particular interaction, as a result of what happens in the network. This   51 
identifies a repeated strategy profile with respect to  th e  p a r tic u la r  su b se t o f  p lay e r s 
constituted by SS and E, and hence induces the following strategy combination whereby 
the psychological game PG will be solved through its repeated play. 
At time t = 1, the strategy profile in the stage-games including the move of just SS 
and E is (e,FSs;FE,CEj) – that is, SS enters and plays F in the PG and the firm plays FE in 
the  PG  and  cooperates  in  the  two  PDs  that  it  plays  with  its  SWj ( b e c a u s e  w e  a r e  
considering only the strategy profile characterizing how repeated games are played by 
SS and E, here we disregard SWj’s choices). This state holds through all the repetitions of 
the PG and DPE,SWj stage-games until someone in the network decides to ‘defect’ at 
some time t. In this case, there are two possible deviations from the just-defined stage-
games strategy profile.  
1.  E carries out the sanction entailed by its MG trigger strategy at time t+1, that is, E 
plays DEj in the PDEj from t+1 onwards. SS’s in the ‘fair’ behaviour of E remains 
unchanged only for the first period t, and the stage-games strategy profile involving 
SS and E both at time t+1 becomes (e,F;FE,DEj). However, from time t+2 onwards, 
the  stage-games  strategy  profile  becomes  (¬e;UE,DEj)  because  the  MG  trigger 
strategy of player SS implies not preventing the defection of E for just one period if 
it  is  the  consequence  of  E’s  MG  trigger  strategy  execution,  but  it  requires 
punishment  of  E  for  all  the  periods  after  it  has  defected  once  against  weak 
stakeholders. According to its MG trigger strategy, E will continue to sanction its 
weak stakeholders from time t+1 onwards, so that from time t+2 the continuation 
strategy profile within this players’ subset becomes  (¬e;UE,DEj). 
2.  For some reason, Player E does not implement the MG trigger strategy at time t+1. 
In  this  case,  SS at  time  t+2 p u n ish e s p lay e r  E f o r  n o t b e h a v in g  so  a s to  r e n d e r  
effective the sanction required for implementation of the MG trigger strategies in the 
network. Since player E reverts to (UE,DEj) when it learns that SS play s ¬e, the 
resulting strategy profile from time t+2 onward relative to the stage-game played by 
SS and E is (¬e;UE,DEj) as well.  
Note that E cannot avoid the decision of SS to play ¬e when someone else starts to 
defect in the network. Let us suppose that after someone has defected in a PD at time t, 
the firm E decides to implement its MG trigger strategy at time t+1 in order to avoid   52 
player SS’s sanction at t+2, but it also tries to avoid the SS sanction at t+3 by coming 
back  cooperating  by  playing  CEj i n  t h e  P D s  t h a t  i t  p l a y s  a t  t i m e  t+2.  Under  the 
hypothesis that the strong stakeholder SS is adopting his/her version of the MG trigger 
strategy just defined in section 5.1, this attempt will be unsuccessful. In fact, once SS 
learns that the firm does not contribute to punishing other agents who are continuing 
defection from t+1 onwards, s/he will in any case punish E.  
 
6.  ‘Sub-Game Perfection’ and Endogenous Sustainability of Cooperation  
 
The aim of the previous section was to define a modified version of MG trigger 
strategies by players E and SS able to support cooperation in all games played in the 
network because player E is sanctioned by SS if it defects in any PDEj. According to the 
analytical framework set out in section 2.1, these strategies played simultaneously with 
standard MG trigger strategies adopted in each repeated game by each pair of adjacent 
agents  in  the  network  define  a  repeated  game  Nash  equilibrium  (verification  of  the 
conditions for existence of this equilibrium is delayed until section 7). Our aim here is 
to  verify  whether  execution  of  player  SS’s  modified  MG  trigger  strategy  is  really 
compatible with player SS’s incentives in the iterated PG: that is, sanctioning player E is 
player  SS’s  best  response  if  E  defects  in  some  PDEj.  The  relevant  game  theoretical 
concept here is the SS strategy’s ‘sub-game perfection’. In other words, if the repeated 
play of games according to the players’ MG trigger strategies (modified or otherwise) 
were  to  reach  branches  or  sub-games  out  of  the  equilibrium  path,  then  in  that 
contingency the sanctions implicit in player SS’s strategy could be rationally carried out 
in accordance with player SS’s incentives. In this regard, we first present an intuitive 
analysis  of  sub-game  perfection  with  reference  to  the  stage-game  PG  psychological 
equilibrium taken as a game on its own. We will make informal use of the idea of 
‘trembling hand’: that is, the possibility that, owing to random mistakes occurring when 
a given equilibrium strategy profile is played, any whatever part of the relevant game 
tree out of the equilibrium path can be reached, even though with low probability. By 
considering the possible deviations due to random mistakes, we will verify that, in any 
situation,  player  SS’s  MG  trigger  strategy  requires  only  playing  a  stage-game 
psychological equilibrium. In other words, even in sub-games out of the equilibrium 
path  the  strategy  profile  is  always  compatible  with t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a  p l a y e r ’ s  b e s t  
response.   53 
6.1 Sub-game perfection in the psychological stage-game  
Before  considering  the  sub-game  perfection  of  the  entire  MG  trigger  strategy  of 
players SS and E, let us determine whether some instability (equilibrium imperfection) 
may be found in the psychological equilibria of the PG stage-game – considered on its 
own – based on player SS’s and E’s conformist preferences. Figure 8 illustrates the PG 
in  extensive  form  under  the  hypotheses  of  mutually  consistency  and  common 
knowledge  of  (at  least)  first-  and  second-degree  beliefs  –  which  are  typical  of 
psychological games. Payoff vectors reported on the edge of each game tree branch 
show  that  both  players  have  iteratively  predicted  that  they  would  play  the  moves 
belonging  to  the  path  reaching  a  particular  edge.  Hence,  they  include  the  ideal 
component of players’  payoffs that materialize when mutual beliefs are reciprocally  
consistent  and  conformist  preferences  are  activated.  To  satisfy  the  conditions  on 
parameters given in section 3.4 (λ >d − b and λ >c − a) we here assume λ  = 2.5. An 
explanation is required for the two payoff vectors reported at the branch edge ¬e. Each 
vector assigns the players’ overall payoffs (included ideal utilities) based respectively 
on a different beliefs system concerning how the game would have been played in the 
remaining part of the game tree. On the left side is the psychological payoffs vector 
under the hypothesis that reciprocally consistent first- and second-order beliefs predict 
that players would choose (¬e,UE), while on the right side is the psychological payoffs 
vector under the hypothesis that reciprocally consistent first- and second-order beliefs 
predict that players would choose (¬e,FE). 
We use intuitively the notion of sub-game perfection to analyze this game. Hence, 
for each psychological equilibrium, we will consider what would happen if, under the 
hypothesis that players are playing a particular equilibrium strategy profile, some sub-
game or branch is reached out of the equilibrium-path, and whether in this case playing 
according to the equilibrium strategies would be irrational for the relevant player. In 
order to conduct this analysis we use an intuitive application of the “trembling hand” 
argument.  Reinard  Selten  (1967,  1975)  suggested  this  idea  in  order  to  introduce  a 
random  perturbation  into  games  by  means  of  uncorrelated  small  probabilities  of 
deviation, so that, with some probability, each sub-game or branch of the game tree – 
also out of the equilibrium path – can be reached when players are in fact playing a 
given  equilibrium.  Equilibrium  perfection  consists  in  robustness  of  the  equilibrium   54 
behavior  under  the  game  perturbation  induced  by  such  small  probabilities  of 
uncorrelated  random  deviation  “by  mistake”.  Note  that  the  extensive-form  game  of 
Figure  8  includes  two  sub-games:  one  starting  from  the  second  information  set 
attributed to player E, and one starting from the individual choice attributed to player SS 
at the first information set, beyond the entire game itself.  
 
Figure 8 Extensive form of the PG stage-game with consistent belief systems  




To  begin  with,  consider  that  players  SS a n d  E  a r e  p l a y i n g  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
equilibrium  (e,F;FE)  and  are  hence  endowed  with  the  relevant  mutually  consistent 
beliefs that predict such a state and consequently induce their conformist preferences. 
Then introduce with small probability a random mistake that when player SS is playing 
e, s/he is in fact playing ¬e, so that s/he ends the game. Assuming that player E knows 
this random mistake probability, at the second decision node should it play differently 
with regard its equilibrium strategy? Consider that the players’ beliefs are consistent 
with (e,F;FE). Then the selection of ¬e under the belief that player E chooses FE will 
entail, with small probability, a psychological payoff 1.31 for player E, which would be 
enhanced if, in the case of mistake, player SS entertained the belief that player E is 
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playing  UE.  On  the  other  hand,  if  player  E  changes  its  choice to  U E a t  t h e  s e c o n d  
information set, it can fool player SS, who – believing that E has played FE –continues to 
play F, so that E reaches a payoff 4 less than 4.5. Nevertheless, consider that player SS 
must know that player E has changed its behavior at the second information set because 
of  the  probability  of  a  mistake;  otherwise  she  would  not  believe  that  player  E  has 
chosen UE when s/he mistakenly plays ¬e (enhancing its payoff to 4 instead of 1.31). 
Because of this prediction, however, s/he would play U at the third information set. As a 
result, in order to obtain a tiny improvement in its payoff in the case of a mistaken ¬e 
choice, which occurs with very small probability, with high probability E forgoes a 
payoff 4.5 to obtain a payoff 3 instead, which is clearly irrational. Hence, under the 
‘trembling hand’ hypothesis, player E must not change its behavior with respect to what 
is required by its strategy in the equilibrium (e,F;FE). 
Now consider the hypothesis that players are playing the psychological equilibrium 
(¬e;UE) with reciprocally consistent beliefs. Then introduce the small  probability of 
mistake that, when playing ¬e, player SS is in fact playing e. They are thus allowed to 
reach the sub-game that starts from the second information set, which is out of the 
equilibrium path. Should this perturbation of the game tree induce player E to change its 
strategy, which requires it to implement the move UE? Certainly not. Consider that, 
since they are playing according to the equilibrium (¬e;U E), player SS b e lie v e s th a t 
player E plays UE if its information set is reached by a random mistake occurring at the 
first node. Consistently with this belief, player SS’s best response is to choose U if the 
third  information  set  is  reached  (by  a  random  mistake).  Moreover,  in  order  to  be 
predicted as playing UE (according to the rationality assumption), player E must believe 
that player SS, if his/her second decision node has been reached, would play U. Thus 
player E’s best response is to play UE at its information set if, by mistake with small 
probability,  it  is  reached.  This  incentive-compatible behavior in the sub-game  gives 
player E a payoff 3 that adds with small (mistake) probability to the high probability 
payoff 3.5. What, on the contrary, is the case if player E decides to change its move at 
the  second  decision  node?  Because  player  SS’s  beliefs  are  still  consistent  with  the 
equilibrium (¬e;UE), she will nevertheless play U, so that E obtains a poor payoff 2 
instead of 3, which is clearly irrational.    56 
Finally, consider the case that players are playing the equilibrium (e,U;UE) and have 
beliefs consistent with this psychological equilibrium – that is, they are both predicted 
to play U after SS has entered. But again introduce the small random mistake probability 
that when SS is playing e, she is in fact playing ¬e. What is player E’s reaction to this 
probability of mistake? Consider that, under the current beliefs of the players – that is, 
in  the  sub-game  they  will  both  play  (U;UE)  in  the  case  of  mistake  (with  small 
probability) – they will get a payoff 4 higher than 3. In fact, if player SS chooses ¬e 
when  believing  that  player  E  will  play  UE ( w h i c h  i s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  r e q u i r e d  b y  t h e  
psychological  equilibrium  under  consideration),  then  the  psychological  payoff  is  4. 
Could player E enhance its payoff further by changing its behavior to FE? Certainly not 
in the case of a mistake, for if SS chooses ¬e while believing that player E is playing FE 
the psychological payoff for both decreases to 1.31. Why, therefore, should player SS 
believe that player E in the case of mistake is changing its behavior so that its own 
payoff is reduced? But if player SS has no reason to believe that player E is changing its 
behavior, she will play U when his/her decision node is reached (s/he, in fact, continues 
to believe that E is playing UE); hence, by changing its move, player E would worsen its 
payoff from 3 to 2 with high probability. Thus there is no basis for saying that incentive 
compatibility and the logic of best response under the perturbation hypothesis would 
induce the players to change their moves in the game. 
To sum up, under the intuitive ‘trembling hand’ hypothesis that allows players  to the 
reach any branch of the game tree out of the equilibrium path, nothing  authorizes them, 
as long as they are rational, to make any significant modifications with respect to what 
is required by each of the three psychological equilibria.  
6.2  Definition of the relevant sub-game  
Each adjacent pair of agents in the relational network are players involved in two 
subsequent repeated games, except for player E, that plays three repeated games with its 
adjacent stakeholders, and SS who plays just one repeated game with E. The strategies 
whereby  all  players  make  their  choices  in  each  stage-game  at  any  time  are  made 
conditional on choices made by all other players in the network through the assumption 
that each player adopts an MG trigger strategy (including the modified version defined 
in section 5). These are rules for deciding how to play any stage-game at any time in 
function  of  the  past  history  of  the  game.  However,  MG  trigger  strategies  have  the   57 
peculiarity that how each player chooses at any time t in a given stage-game depends on 
the decisions made at a time t-1 by any other player participating in the network, also 
playing a different and remote repeated game. In fact, if a defection occurs somewhere 
in the network, any player, according to his/her MG trigger strategy, starts to punish the 
players  s/he  is  related  with,  thereby  changing  any  player’s  incentive  to  continue 
cooperation in the immediately subsequent game that s/he plays with his/her successor 
in  the  network.  This  construction  makes  it  possible t o  c o n s i d e r  a l l  t h e  s t a g e - g a m e s  
played at time t as if they were sub-games of a unique dynamic game played at any time 
t by all the network’s agents. Moreover, the dynamic game is repeated ad infinitum, and 
the way in which each repetition is played – under our current assumptions – is dictated 
at any time by the players’ MG trigger strategies.  
Within  this  context,  we  must  define  the  proper  sub-game  to  be  analyzed.  It  is 
necessary to select a sub-game that may convey not just the information that E has 
abandoned  its  stage-game  equilibrium  strategy  FE,  shifting  to  the  other  stage-game 
strategy UE, but also the information that, in some subsequent PD games with SWj, it has 
played DEj instead of CEj
 after having played the strategy FE in PG
 . Put differently, it is 
necessary that the stage game – taken as the relevant sub-game of the overall dynamic 
game played by all the network’s players – allows player SS to entertain correct beliefs 
not only on the choices FE or UE that player E makes in the PG, but also on choices that 
it makes in the subsequent PDEj. Of course, player SS needs to understand whether 
player E is consistent with a ‘fair’ mode of playing the PG (strategy FE of the stage 
game) also in consideration of how it plays the following PDEj game, because it is only 
in  these  games  that  the  amount  of  surplus  saved  on  behalf  of  players  SWj w i l l  b e  
effectively allocated to pay them fairly for their cooperation with E. Recall that this was 
our first assumption in section 4.3 and that it was also incorporated in the assumption 
that player SS believes that player E is playing FE with probability zero if s/he learns 
about its defection in the subsequent PDEj. 
The underlying intuitive idea is that if in the PG stage-game one or both of the 
players choose the collusive and egoist strategy U, no part of the surplus is saved or 
entitled to SWj, so that the result of PG has no effect on the payoffs accruing to the SWj 
in the subsequent PDEj games. This is clear when SS plays U unilaterally, since s/he 
simply takes away from the game for his/her personal consumption the extra-rent that   58 
could be allocated to the SWj for his/her personal consumption. But this is also true if E 
chooses  UE b e c a u s e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  E  t h u s  a l l o c a t e s  t o  t h e  p r i vate  earnings  of  E’s 
shareholders  or  managers  any  extra-rent  that  otherwise  could  be  an  endowment 
available to the firm in order to improve its cooperation with SWj. Thus, if the players 
choose U or UE in PG there is no information that can arise from the subsequent games 
concerning player E’s consistency with the adopted strategy or the effective payoffs 
engendered in PG. In these cases player SS will obtain directly from the equilibrium 
solution of PG all the information necessary to establish that E plays unfairly, so that 
s/he will anyway not trust E for ‘Fair play’. Choices like CEj and DEj in these cases may 
only  give  information  about  how  player  E  responds  to  ‘external’  incentives  (with 
respect to PG) deriving from the subsequent stage-games or the MG trigger strategies 
that players adopt to play these repeated games and are indifferent with respect to the 
PG game payoffs. If these choices are reported in the sub-game under consideration it is 
only for completeness of the formal representation, and without giving any information 
about their outcome in the subsequent games. Their attached payoffs are only relative to 
the PG, with respect to which they are indifferent. To be sure, nor does the information 
concerning the choice of PDEj strategies by player E if the PG was played according the 
equilibrium (e,F;FE) give any information about the payoffs distribution depending on 
the solution of subsequent PDEj games. What it does provide, however, is very relevant 
information concerning whether the PG payoffs really correspond to what is expected 
from playing the equilibrium (e,F;FE).  
In fact, when the PG is played according to the equilibrium (e,F;FE) a part of the 
surplus is saved and entitled to the SWj (according to Figure 5 it amounts to 2 utils). The 
interpretation is that player E is committed to using it in order to pay the SWj a fairer 
payoff for mutual cooperation in the PDEj games. This will not change – as we shall 
soon see – the basic strategic structure of the PDEj game. It can be considered as only an 
addition to the payoff that SWj gets conditionally on how player E will play these games. 
In particular, if player E chooses to cooperate by CEj with the SWj, the amount of 2 utils 
saved on behalf of SWj is effectively used to pay him/her more than the standard PDEj 
payoffs otherwise characterizing E’s relations with weak stakeholders.  
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Figure 10(a) The basic PDEj in normal form 
           SWj 
E  
         CjE
           DjE 
       CEj               2 ,     1           - 1 ,     2  
      DEj           4 ,     - 1             1 ,     0  
Figure 10(b) The PDEj if the antecedent PG has been solved by (e,F;FE) 
              SWj 
 
E(e,F, F)   
             CjE
             DjE 
       CEj               2 . 5 ,     2 . 5           - 1 ,         4  
      DEj             6 . 5 ,           - 1 . 5             1 ,     0  
 
To  illustrate  how  the  PG  game  equilibrium  solution  (e,F;FE)  may  affect  the 
subsequent PDWj’s payoff levels, see Figures 10(a) and Figure 10(b). The first figure is 
a numerical example of the basic PD game played by any two adjacent players in the 
network. It also represents the interaction between E and SWj seen as independent from 
the conclusion of the antecedent game played by E and SS. The figure reports the PDEj 
game as it will typically unfold if the antecedent PG game had an unfair solution such 
as (e,U;UE), or (¬e;UE). The second figure illustrates how the former payoff matrix is 
changed by the additional payoffs 2 provided to SWj by the solution (e,F;FE) reached by 
E and SS in the antecedent PG, granted that E plays cooperation CEj in the PDEj. Note, 
however,  that  in  PDEj p l a y e r  E  i s  n o t  c o n s t r a i n e d  t o  d o  s o  b y  t h e  s o l u t i on  of  the 
antecedent game PG, since it can choose its strategy freely, and also appropriate the 
extra-rent by playing DEj in the game.  
The payoff transformation in 10(b) can be explained as follows. The endowment of 2 
utils saved on behalf of player SWj through the fair solution of the antecedent PG game, 
is managed by player E in PDEj so that it can be mutually advantageous in the case of 
full cooperation between them. E allocates the endowment to paying player SWj a higher 
wage  in  exchange  for  a  player’s  SWj e x t r a - e f f o r t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  w h a t  w a s  a l r e a d y  
incorporated in payoffs of Figure 10(a). Effort enters SWj  payoffs negatively (-0.5) but   60 
produces an advantage (+0.5) for E. The result is an effectively fairer (equal) payoff in 
the case of mutual cooperation (CEj, CjE) = (2.5, 2.5) in the DPEj (with a significant 
improvement of SWj payoffs with respect to the basic game). However, the game has not 
changed its basic Prisoner’s Dilemma structure. By playing ‘defection’, SWj can take the 
entire payment (the basic wage 2 plus the additional payoff 2) without incurring any 
production cost. On the other hand, if SWj agrees to increase his/her investment by 0.5, 
player E may appropriate the entire surplus engendered both player SWj’s basic and 
additional investments  (4+0.5) plus the additional 2 utils that were saved on behalf of 
SWj, but in this case were in fact simply ‘robbed’ by E.  
It can also be verified that the payoff transformation by means of the additional 2 
utils  does  not  change  the  players’  incentive  to  cooperate  in  the  repeated P D .  I n  
particular, it does not eliminate the basic asymmetry that characterizes the PDEj. That is 
to say, whereas each SWj considers continuous cooperation with E worth carrying out by 
repeated plays of the game, player E (the firm) does not find it sufficiently profitable to 
play iterated cooperation with the SWi, and prefers to defect even in the repeated game. 
This  can  be  seen  by  comparing  the  critical  discount r a t e s  δ *  that  make  repeated 
cooperation for the two players profitable under the two cases with their actual discount 
rate δ . In the basic and modified case respectively, the player’s E critical discount rates 
are  
δ E* = (4-2)/(4-1) = 0.666,   δ E** = (6.5–2.5) / (6.5 -1) = 0.7272  
Since by assumption player E’s actual discount rate (or level of myopia) is δ  < δ *, it 
is necessarily also δ  < δ ** (since 0.666 < 0.7272), so that in the modified PDEj game 
E has an even more intense incentive to defect from repeated cooperation. On the other 
hand, the respective critical discount rates that make repeated cooperation profitable for 
players SWj in the two cases are  
δ Swj* = (2-1)/2 = 0.5,   δ  Swj ** = (4-2.5)/4 = 0.375  
In this case, by assumption player SWj’s actual discount rate (or myopia level) is δ > δ* 
and hence necessarily δ > δ** (since 0.5 >0.375). Whereas the payoff-transformed PDEj 
game – due to the antecedent PG game’s fair solution – makes players SWj even more 
willing  to  engage  in  mutually  profitable  cooperation  with  E,  nonetheless  the 
transformed  PDEj reinforces game player E’s preference for defection. Therefore the   61 
external support for cooperation deriving from the ‘Fair play’ psychological payoff in 
the PG is even more important in order to sustain cooperation in the PDEj 
There is consequently a very compelling sense in which player SS needs to assess 
player E’s behavior in the subsequent PDEj in order to ascertain whether the fair strategy 
FE has been effectively played in PG. To understand whether player E has effectively 
implemented  the  strategy  FE c h o s e n  i n  P G ,  s / h e  m u s t  c h e c k  E ’ s  b e h a v i o r  u n t i l  t he 
subsequent stage game is reached, wherein the allocation of the endowment to improve 
SWj conditions is carried out through C Ej. Otherwise, the FE choice in PG would be 
ineffectual or simply apparent, since what in fact results is the same outcome that E 
could have determined by choosing UE when SS chose F (i.e. E appropriates the residual 
of 2 utils set aside by  SS). In this case, player SS considers the play er E’s  pair of 
subsequent moves (FE,DEj) as essentially identical to playing UE in the PG (recall SS’s 
learning rule in section 5.1). 
Consequently, the relevant sub-game must include the following information: has the 
strategy adopted by E in the subsequent PDEj effectively allocated the payoff 2 to the 
dummy player according to the saving decisions (F;FE)? If E plays CEj it has effectively 
implemented the strategy F understood as consistent with the T principle agreed in the 
pre-play stage of PG. If E plays DEj it has simply betrayed player SS. The proper sub-
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Figure 11 The relevant sub-game in extensive form, illustrated only in terms of 
material payoffs 
 
Note again that, in order to convey the relevant information, the sub-game includes 
the choices CEj
 and DEj in the subsequent PDEj but does not anticipate the description of 
the following stage-game payoffs. However, if player E adopts the strategy (FE, DEj), 
against SS playing (e,F), the material payoff vector becomes (2,4,0). The psychological 
payoffs change accordingly. Only if player E plays the pair (FE,CEj) when SS plays (e,F) 
are  the  material  payoffs  of  the  PG  (2,2,2),  which  may give rise to a psychological 
equilibrium of the game.  
As in section 6.1, the psychological payoffs can be computed under the assumption 
of mutually consistent and common knowledge of reciprocal first- and second-order 
beliefs that activate conformist preferences (once again it is assumed that  λ  = 2.5). 
Figure  12  illustrates  the  corresponding  sub-game  in n o r m a l  f o r m ,  w h e r e  t h e  
psychological payoffs are computed to represent conformist preferences.  
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Figure 12 Normal form of the relevant psychological sub-game 
          E 
SS 
  
   (FE,CEj) 
  
  (FE,DEj) 
 
  (UE,CEj) 
  
 (UE,DEj) 
(e,F)  4.5,  4.5, (2)   2,  4,   (0)   2,   4,  (0)   2,  4, (0) 
(e,U)   4,    2,   (0)   4,   2,  (0)   3,   3,  (0)    3,  3, (0) 
¬e  1.31, 1.31, (1)  3.5, 3.5, (1)   3.5, 3.5, (1)   3.5, 3.5, (1) 
 
Player E’s strategies are labeled CEj and DEj only in order to account for what may 
happen in the stage-game PG because of these components of player E’s strategies as 
well.  Again,  no  consideration  is  given  here  to  the  payoffs  that  these  strategies  will 
accrue to player E when the proper PDEj is played. Recall also that only when they are 
associated with FE are the strategies CEj and DEj material to this sub-game. Inspection of 
the psychological payoff matrix shows that the three psychological equilibria present in 
the game of Figure 6 and discussed in sections 3.3 and 3.4 also exist in the just-defined 
sub-game. 
Consider  first  the  stage-game  strategy  profile  (e,F;FE,CEj).  This  is  the  sub-game 
psychological equilibrium inducing ‘Fair play’ in the PG and ‘cooperation’ by player E 
in the subsequent PDEj. In fact, the chosen value of λ  and mutually consistent first- and 
second-order reciprocal beliefs predicting that player SS will use (e,F) and player E will 
use (FE,CEj), respectively, induce the psychological payoffs vector (4.5,4.5) for the two 
active players that makes such strategies clearly mutual best responses. The distinctive 
feature of this sub-game representation is that, in order to give rise to such a ‘Fair play’ 
psychological equilibrium, player E’s consistency in the consequent PDEj game must be 
included in the strategy description. This consists in using the cooperative strategy CEj 
that entails no appropriation by E of the surplus share saved for SWi by choosing the Fair 
strategies F and FE in PG.    
Also the strategy profile (¬e;UE,DEj) is a sub-game psychological equilibrium. If 
both the players reciprocally believe that E will play UE in the sub-game if SS enters, 
whereas player SS will ‘stay out’ by playing ¬e, given the chosen value of λ  the payoff   64 
vector in the sub-game for the two active player becomes (3.5,3.5), and ¬e, (UE
, DEj) are 
the  mutual  best  responses.  This  equilibrium  is  apparently  weak  because  E  has  two 
further strategies, (FE,DEj) and (UE,CEj), that give the same psychological payoffs when 
player SS chooses ¬e and beliefs are aligned with the relevant strategy profiles. But this 
is not the case. To see why, consider the third strategy profile (e,U;UE,DEj). If the beliefs 
of players E and SS are such that each thinks that they will play collusively and that they 
believe that she/it will play collusively, then the value of λ  goes to 0 and the payoff 
vector for active players is (3, 3), which entails that (U;UE) is a pair of  mutual best 
responses in the sub-game. Clearly, this is a strategy profile that defines a psychological 
equilibrium in the sub-game under consideration, and also in all the subsequent PDEj – 
where it coincides with the unique equilibrium point of one-shot Prisoners’ Dilemmas. 
Recall  in  fact  that  player  E’s  strategy  (UE,DEj)  means  that  it  will  defect  in  its 
relationship with weak stakeholders in the PDEj, which is in line with E’s incentives 
internal to the  subsequent  Prisoners’ Dilemma Games seen as sub-games (so that there 
is no difficulty in maintaining that any strategy profile of the current sub-game that 
prescribes  that  this  player  E  strategy  choice  will  be  incentive-compatible  in  the 
following sub-games for E).  
Note the importance of the foregoing argument in regard to the apparent weakness of 
the sub-game equilibrium (¬e;UE,DEj). The strategy (UE,DEj) is compatible with both 
the last two equilibria, and  for whatever mutually consistent belief system, in at least 
one  case  (UE,DEj)  gives  player  E  an  higher  psychological  payoff  than  (FE,DEj). 
Therefore  it  is  weakly  dominant  on  the  strategy  (FE,DEj).  Since  weakly-dominated 
strategies like (FE,DEj) can be eliminated, there is no reason for E to be consistently 
believed  to  have  chosen  (FE,DEj).  Thus  the  strategy  profile  (¬e;FE,DEj)  is  not  a 
reasonable psychological equilibrium of the sub-game (the mutually consistent belief 
system that could justify it is not consistent with common knowledge of rationality). 
But  what  about  E’s  strategy  (UE,CEj)?  Under  the  proper  beliefs  systems  this  allows 
strategy profiles (e,U;UE,CEj) and (¬e; UE,CEj) that correspond to payoff vectors (3, 3) 
and (3.5, 3.5). These are psychological equilibria of the sub-game, so that (e,U;UE,DEj) 
also seems to be a weak equilibrium, while (¬e;UE,DEj) remains weak owing to this 
indifferent alternative. But consider that (UE,CEj) entails that player E will cooperate in 
the subsequent PDEj games, under the conditions that in the antecedent PG game the 
equilibrium  solutions  are  either  (e,U;  UE,  CEj)  or  (¬e;  UE,CEj).  Both  such  profiles   65 
exclude ‘Fair play’ in the PG and do not provide E with any conditional incentive for 
cooperation in the PDEj (recall that player E’s MG trigger strategy requires it to play 
‘defect’ in the subsequent DPWj if the antecedent PG game play er S S’s strategy has  
been  either  (e,U)  or  ¬e).  Thus  the  strategy  (UE,CEj)  is  clearly  dominated  by  the 
alternative (UE,DEj) in the sub-games that follow the one considered here, and hence 
cannot be considered as part of reasonable psychological equilibria of the sub-game 
under consideration (there is no basis for a mutually consistent system of beliefs that  
predicts player E will cooperate in the PDEj when SS does not resort to a strategy that 
benefits E with the psychological payoffs associated with Fair play conditional on the 
prosecution of cooperation). Not only can player E’s strategy (FE,DEj) be eliminated in 
the current sub-game, but also the strategy  (UE,CEj),  because  it  is  dominated  in  the 
subsequent  PDEj  sub-games  –  being  not  superior  to  (UE,DEj)  in  the  current  one. 
Consequently, there are only three strategy profiles that are reasonable psychological 
equilibria in the sub-game.   
6.3  Sub-game perfection of players’ SS and E MG trigger strategies 
In this section we finally show that the combination of player SS and E’s modified 
MG trigger strategies as defined in sections 5.1, 5.2  and  5.3  is  a  sub-game  perfect 
equilibrium. The task is accomplished by considering various cases in which one can 
observe a deviation from the equilibrium path that would be traced in the current sub-
game under the hypothesis that the two players follow their MG trigger strategies. We 
will verify the equilibrium property of choices that the players should make according 
to this pair of repeated strategies out-of-the-equilibrium-path in the relevant sub-game. 
This  again  employs  an  intuitive  version  of  the  “trembling  hand”  argument  used  in 
section 6.1. 
To begin with, recall that execution of SS’s and E’s pair of MG trigger strategies, 
adopted to play repeated games, entails in the sub-game currently under consideration 
that the strategy profile (e,F;FE,CEj) will be implemented. Thus, as long as neither player 
deviates from his/her equilibrium strategy, this strategy profile induces ‘Fair play’ in 
each repetition of the PG and player E’s ‘cooperation’ in each repetition of any PDEj. 
The  learning  rules  whereby  the  players  adapt  their  beliefs  to  the  past  behaviour  of 
players in the network work as stated in sections 51 and 5.2 respectively. Finally, if 
player SS understands that player E is de facto playing UE in the PG, his/her MG trigger   66 
strategy dictates reverting to ¬e. At the same time, when player E learns that player SS 
will not keep playing (e,F) but from the foregoing  period has changed to U or ¬e, 
according to its MG trigger strategy, it must also change to U in the PG and also to DEj 
in the subsequent PDEj. 
Hence, assume that when players E and SS are adopting the modified MG trigger 
strategies, there is a small probability of the occurrence of a random mistake such that at 
time t they find themselves out-of-the-equilibrium-path. According to the sanctioning 
part of their grim trigger strategy, actions would produce a strategy profile different 
from  (e,F;FE,CEj)  in  the  current  sub-game  (see  Figures  11  and  12).  The  random 
deviation is imputable to player E because of one of three possible mistakes: (a) at time 
t-1, contrary to expectations, E has stopped playing FE and started to play UE in the PG ; 
(b) at time t-1, after playing FE as expected, E has been the first in the network to play 
DEj (without any  justification); (c) at time t-1, after the information was transmitted 
throughout the network that one member had played uncooperatively  at time t-2, E 
continued playing CEj.  
According to his/her learning rules, after having observed at time t-1 UE or (FE,DEj) 
or also (FE,CEj) (in the special case that information circulated that someone else had 
played D in some PD in the network), at time t, SS realizes that player E is de facto 
playing the PG unfairly, that is, the probability of FE is 0. Thus his/her MG trigger 
strategy requires that SS play  ¬e at time t in the PG (which is coherent with these 
beliefs).   
On  the  other  hand,  player  E’s  MG  trigger  strategy  requires  it  to  play  (UE,DEj) 
because the condition for continuing to play (FE,CEj) that nobody in any PD at time t-1 
deviated from Cki has been violated either by E itself (case b) or by another player in the 
network (case c). In fact, for these cases, E’s learning rules state that the probability of 
SS playing ¬e is 1. Moreover, player E’s MG trigger strategy requires it to start playing 
(UE, DEj) if E itself at time t-1 played UE (coherently with its learning rule that predicts 
in this case that the probability of SS playing (e,F) is 0). 
Do these strategies induce any irrational choice in the relevant sub game out-of-the 
equilibrium-path? Note that if E plays (FE,DEj) at t-1 (case b), it would not be rational 
for E to continue playing in this way, because this is a weakly dominated strategy. If E 
thinks that SS is going to play ¬e at t, (FE,DEj), it would not be a better response than   67 
(UE,DEj). But if E realises that SS thinks that it believes s/he is going to play U, so that 
she chooses U, then playing (FE,DEj) at t would be inferior to playing (UE,DEj). There is 
no reason for E to play a strategy that can only give it less than the alternative. This is 
consistent with player SS’s learning rule that induces him/her, after observing at t- 1, to 
believe that E will play UE. Thus the profile (e,F;FE,DEj) can be only a transitory state 
from the initial profile to a different continuation strategy profile. It cannot stabilize. 
Neither  could  player  E  respond  to  the  deviation  by  playing  in  the  sub-game  (even 
though this was its deviation at t-1). In fact, player SS’s learning rule induces him/her to 
play ¬e and it must be believed by E. Moreover, there is no incentive for E’s repeated 
cooperation in the subsequent PDEj without a psychological payoff deriving from PG. 
Finally, in the cases of both mistake b) and c), E must know that throughout the network 
players have started the sanction stage of their MG trigger strategies, so that there will 
no longer be cooperation in the PD(s). Thus replying the deviation by (UE,CEj) would be 
irrational. By contrast, the profile (¬e;UE,DEj) is a psychological equilibrium of the sub-
game, and under the appropriate mutually consistent reciprocal beliefs system it could 
emerge as a completely rational combination of mutually best responses. Indeed, player 
SS’s rules of belief adaptation predict that E will play UE, while player E’s rules of 
belief  adaptation  predict  that  player  SS w i l l  p l a y  ( ¬e).  These  beliefs  are  common 
knowledge. Thus each player has a second-order belief predicting exactly the change of 
beliefs which is occurring to the other player. Given the first- and second-order beliefs 
that they will play the pair (¬e; UE) in the PG at t, player SS must also believe that E 
will play DEj in the subsequent games, and this is also player E’s only second-order 
belief about SS’s beliefs that is consistent with E’s choice. Under our assumption of the 
value  of  λ ,  conformist  preferences  are  activated  in  the  PG  and  the  psychological 
equilibrium  (¬e;  UE,  DEj)  arises  at  time  t  in  the  sub-game.  The  deviation  from  the 
equilibrium  path  –  after  one  stage  –  induces  the  transition  from  one  psychological 
equilibrium of the sub-game to another. The strategy profile in which SS sanctions the 
deviation coincides with the emergence of a sub-game psychological equilibrium, so 
that there is no instability in the required behavior and the carrying out of the threat is 
perfectly credible.  
But  now  assume  that  the  relevant  deviation  in  E’s  behavior  occurs  at  time  t-1 
because of a choice by a SWj player who – in contrast with the execution of his/her MG 
trigger strategy – during the cooperative stage t-2 mistakenly deviates to CWj. According   68 
to its MG trigger strategy at t-1, player E must play (FE,DEj), and at the subsequent time 
t i t  m u s t  p l a y  ( U E,DEj).  The  deviation  at  time  t-2 d o e s  n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  a f f e c t  S S’s 
behaviour in the sub-game at time t-1, because his/her beliefs about E change only 
conditionally on the learning of its effective choice in a stage-sub-game. Thus, in the 
transition stage t-1, SS still chooses (e,F), while player E chooses (FE,DEj) , giving rise to 
(e,F; FE,DEj). This is clearly an unstable strategy profile that may last only the time 
necessary for player SS to realize that E is de facto playing the sub-game unfairly. From 
time  t o n w a r d s ,  t h e  p l a y e r s  w i l l  r e v e r t  t o  t h e  s u b - g a m e  p sychological  equilibrium 
(¬e;UE,DEj)  through  a  line  of  reasoning  completely  analogous  to  the  one  given  for 
deviations directly due to player E’s mistakes. Essentially, at time t-1, E correctly does 
not changes its beliefs about SS since it knows that his/her learning rules and strategy 
forgives a single period in which E may play (FE,DEj) in order to start punishing SWj. 
From t onwards, however, player SS’s first-order beliefs will be aligned with player E’s 
behaviour, and also player E’s beliefs about SS’s choice ¬e and their mutual second-
order beliefs are aligned. The sub-game psychological equilibrium (¬e; UE, DEj) again 
emerges – which is consistent with the sanctioning stages dictated by the players’ MG 
trigger strategies.  
Finally, a deviation may also arise from a mistake by player SS. At time t-2, player SS 
chooses U, in contrast with his/her MG trigger strategy, while player E still chooses 
(FE,CEj).  The  result  in  the  sub-game  at  time  t-2 i s  a  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  t r a n s i t i o n  s t a t e  
(U;FE,CEj). Players do not have mutually consistent beliefs, since – to exemplify – E 
fails to predict SS’s
 choice, believing mistakenly that s/he is still choosing (e,F), and SS 
believes that E fails to predict his/her behavior because E believes it is still (e,F) when 
s/he is choosing U instead.  
At time t-1, because of the rule of beliefs adaptation, player E comes to believe that 
SS chooses U with probability 1, and in the relevant sub-game, owing to its MG trigger 
strategy, E starts playing (UE,DEj). At the same time, SS correctly believes that E is 
playing (UE,DEj), because of the learning rule whereby s/he  no longer believes at t that 
E will play FE if some player deviated at time t-2 from its component of the strategy 
profile (e,F;FE,CEj). Moreover, because  SS knows that it is unprofitable for player E to 
cooperate in the iterated PDEj when there is no Fair play in the PG, SS also predicts DEj. 
Because of common knowledge of the players’ beliefs adaptation rules, it is likely that,   69 
at t-1, players entertain the following second-order beliefs: player E predicts that SS 
believes it is playing (UE,DEj); player SS predicts that E believes s/he is choosing U.  
Thus, if SS were effectively choosing U at time t-1, the result would be (e,U;UE,DEj). 
Given  the  aforesaid  first-  and  second-order  beliefs –   E b  = U ,   Ss b  =  ( U E,DEj)  ; 
2
E b  =  
(UE,DEj), 
2
Ss b  = U – that strategy combination would be a psychological equilibrium of 
the sub-game: to be sure, a psychological equilibrium wherein the players’ ideal payoffs 
are nil, because of the unfair distribution, but nevertheless a psychological equilibrium 
that would stabilize and replicate at time t and thereafter. This would entail that, when a 
random deviation is caused by SS, a collusion equilibrium is reached in the sub-game at 
time t-1,  contrary  to  the  requirements  of  the  MG  trigger  strategies of both players, 
which command that any deviation be sanctioned by the stay-out strategy of player SS. 
However, this is not the case. It is true that player SS’s adaptation rule states that if 
s/he at t-2 has not chosen (e,F), then s/he believes with probability 1 that at time t-1 E 
will  do  U,  but  his/her  modified  MG  trigger  strategy a l s o  s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  a t  t-2 a n y  
whatever player has deviated from his/her component of the strategy profile (e,F;FE,CEj) 
then at t-1 S S will move to ¬e. Thus, at t-1, the result is in fact (¬e;UE,DEj), which 
contradicts player E’s first-order belief that SS does (e,U) and entails that player SS’s 
second-order belief that E believes that s/he does (e,U) mistakenly predicts his/her own 
behavior  so  that  s/he  knows  that  the  beliefs  system is in c o n siste n t.  A t time  t-1 th e 
players’ reciprocal beliefs system does not exhibit the typical mutual consistency and 
alignment with actual behavior required for psychological equilibria. Therefore, at t-1, 
neither the psychological equilibrium (e,U,UE,DEj) – which is what player E mistakenly 
predicts will happen – nor the psychological equilibrium (¬e;UE,DEj) – which is what 
actually  occurs,  even  though  it  is  not  consistently r e p r e s e n t e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  p l a y e r s ’  
beliefs – emerge. In the actual state of affairs (¬e;UE,DEj), in fact, the players cannot 
profit from any psychological payoff, given their mutually inconsistent beliefs system 
(E does not believe what SS really does, and SS predicts that E does not believe what 
s/he really does), so that they obtain only the material payoffs (1,1).  
But, at time t, E’s beliefs are finally aligned with SS actual behavior. Because of 
what has been observed at t-1, E believes that SS does ¬e, while SS continues to believe 
that E chooses (UE,DEj). Since they know the reciprocal rules of adaptation, they also 
correctly  believe  what  they  believe,  and  all  these  beliefs  converging  on  the  state 
(¬e;UE,DEj)  are  aligned  with  their  actual  choices.  This  is  therefore  a  psychological   70 
equilibrium  of  the  sub-game,  which  may  stabilize  and  can  be  replicated  thereafter. 
Moreover,  it  is  completely  consistent  with  the  dictates  of  the  repeated-games  MG 
trigger strategies of the two players.   
To sum up, if a player SS random mistake occurs, two transition periods are needed 
before a psychological equilibrium of the sub-game is reached. At t-2 the outcome is 
(e,U;UE,DEj), with a worse material payoff for E, and a material advantage for SS, no 
payoff to the dummy SWj and no ideal utilities at all. At t-1 the outcome is (¬e;UE, DEj) 
which is not even a psychological equilibrium because of the still inconsistent players’ 
beliefs, so that they merely obtain the ‘stay-out’ material payoff (1,1,1). But at t the 
psychological equilibrium (¬e;UE,DEj) is finally reached because it is supported by the 
appropriate reciprocal and consistent beliefs and provides psychological motivations for 
implementation  of  player  SS’s  sanction  and  support  for  the  ‘would-be-ready-to-
cooperate’ preference by E.  
The conclusion is that, for whatever random mistake that takes the sub-game play 
out of the equilibrium path established by the pair of modified repeated MG trigger 
strategies of player SS and E, there is no reason to think that the out-of-the-equilibrium-
path choices will stabilize on a sub-game psychological equilibrium that would induce 
stable deviation from what the pair of modified grim trigger strategies would require the 
players to do. Especially, there is no reason to think that  the logic and incentives faced 
in the sub-game will prevent player SS fr o m c ar ry ing  o u t th e  p u n ish men t sta g e s o f 
his/her repeated MG trigger strategy which is at the basis of the sustainability of  fair 
cooperation throughout the network when player E has no direct material incentive to 
play cooperatively with both its SWj. By contrast, after a maximum of two transition 
stages, a sub-game psychological equilibrium is reached which  guarantees  that the 
punishment  stages  of  player  SS’s  MG  trigger  strategy  will  be  implemented  in 
accordance  with  his/her  psychological  ‘incentives’  and  the  sub-game  best  response 
logic.  Assuming  that  the  pair  of  modified  MG  trigger  strategies,  together  with  the 
standard ones played by any other player in the network, constitutes a repeated games 
Nash equilibrium, this result ensures that cooperation in the firm-stakeholders-other-
agents  bilaterally  deficient  relational  network  is  endogenously  stable  (Quod  Erat 
Demostrandum).  
 
   71 
7.   Conditions for a firm-stakeholders network fair-cooperative equilibrium  
This section is concerned with the precise conditions whereby the repeated games 
strategies of players SS and E studied so far are a Nash equilibrium of the games that 
they repeatedly play between themselves and (in the case of E) in relation to weak 
stakeholders SWj. This has been presumed thus far in accordance with intuition and 
standard results concerning the MG trigger strategies used in this kind of bilaterally 
deficient relational network, wherein adjacent players are involved in repeated PD(s) 
(see  section  2).  We  have  concentrated  largely  on  the  effective  sustainability  of  the 
cooperation induced by these equilibrium repeated game strategies, because the main 
challenge was their sub-game perfection in the stage-game wherein SS must back all the 
sanctioning mechanisms without apparently having any incentive to do so in the event 
that the need to implement the threat of her strategy arises. But we must now show that 
the modified MG trigger strategies that players SS and E use in their repeated games 
(the PG and PDEj) satisfy the conditions for the existence of a repeated game Nash 
equilibrium.  
We must verify the following (the payoffs reported for the reader’s convenience in 
Figure 13 are the same as in the PG of Figure 7): 
1.  SS prefers to continue: 
  to play (e,F) instead of playing (¬e) as long as E plays (FE) in the PG and  
  to play (e,F) instead of playing (e,U) as long as E plays (FE) in the PG.  
2.  E does not have an incentive to defect either in the PG or in the PDEj as long as:  
  all the players involved in the PDs are cooperating and  
  SS is playing (e,F) 
Figure 13 Again the PG in normal form 






e,F  b+λ Ss, b+λ E, (b)  b, d, (0) 
e,U  d, b, (0)  c, c, (0) 
¬e  a+1/x λ Ss, a+1/x λ E, (a)  a+λ Ss, a+λ E, (a) 
where d >c > b > a and where the conditions for the existence of the psychological 
equilibria are: b+λ E > d, a+λ E < b+λ E, a+λ Ss > c.  
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Let us start with point 1 and consider the payoff that SS may obtain in the repeated 
PG. In order to verify whether SS has any incentive to defect and stop playing (e, F) as 
long as E plays (FE), we have to compare the repeated payoff obtained by SS when s/he 
plays (e,F) and E plays (FE) with:  
a)  the  payoff  obtained  by  SS w h e n  s / h e  p l a y s  ( ¬e)  and  consequently  in  the 
continuation of the game E plays (UE) 
b)  the  payoff  obtained  by  SS w h e n  s / h e  p l a y s  ( e , U )  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  
continuation of the game E plays (UE). 
If  SS a n d  E  p l a y  F  a n d  F E  respectively,  SS o b t a i n s  a  p a y o f f  ( h e r e a f t e r  a l s o  t h e  
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The  payoff  obtained  by  SS i n  c a se  ( a ) ,  i s  o b v i o u s ly  l o w e r  t h a n  t h e  ‘ c o o p e r a t ive 
payoff’ because it is equal to [a+(1/x)λ]δ (the payoff obtained at the first stage when SS 
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Stks a δ δ λ , which is the payoff obtained 
by SS from the second stage, after his/her defection, onwards (recall that b > a). 
The payoff obtained by SS in case (b) is: 
i.  d in the ‘first’ period of deviation, when SS  defects and plays (e,U) while E 
plays FE; 
ii.  c from the ‘second’ period after the deviation onwards when the continuation 
profile becomes (e, U;UE). 
Obviously, neither is this strategy not convenient for SS, at least if we assume that the 
players are endowed with high environmental cognitive social capital so that λ >(d – b), 










c d b  λ . 
With respect to point 2 – the firm’s incentive to depart from the ‘fair-cooperative 
equilibrium’ amounts to choosing ‘Fair play’ in the repeated PG and ‘cooperation’ in   73 
the repeated PDEj – we shall consider the sub-network of relations involving E (see 
Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14 The restricted firm-stakeholders network 
    SW1                 
  S S                   E                    
   SW2 
 
With regard to the relation in which E is involved, note that  ∈RE j   Ej g  ≥ 0 is a 
necessary condition in order for E to continue to play F in the PG. It amounts to saying 
that   ESs g  - ( 1 ESw g + 2 ESw g ) ≥ 0.
15 
We want to show that E has no incentive to defect when it, SS, and all the other 
players in the network are cooperating. E may defect by adopting two strategies. 
A)  E stops cooperating with SWj at time t and, at the same time, it continues to play 
FE in the PG. Given player S S’s belief formation rule, since E is the first to 
defect in PDEj, SS believes that E will defect also in PG at time t+1. For this 
reason (following his/her MG trigger strategy), SS will punish E at time t+1 by 
playing ¬e. Likewise, E anticipates SS’s decision and, at time t+1, will revert 
to UE in the PG. From the period t+1 onwards, the payoffs of the game are 
determined by (¬e;UE,DEj). This case applies if a+λ E ≥ d.
16 
B)  E defects at time t both in the PG (where it starts to play UE) and in PDEj (where 
it plays DEj). In this case, the payoffs obtained by E and SS in the PG at time t, 
are respectively b and d, which are determined by the strategy (e,F;UE). At time 
t+1, SS will play ¬e because s/he believes that E will play UE also at t+1. E 
                                                 
15 Even though the structure of the PG is different from the PDs with regard to which we have defined the 
concepts of deficient and mutual relationship (section 2), by gEStkS we mean the difference between the 
payoff obtained by E when it and StkS play F and the payoff that E obtains by defecting in the relation 
with StkS. 
16 If a+λ  E < d it would be better for E to defect simultaneously in the PG and in the PDEj. See the 
following case B.   74 
anticipates that SS will not enter the PG at time t+1 and continues to play UE. 
For these reasons, from t+1 onwards, we will observe in the repeated PG the 
strategies (¬e;UE) that generate the payoffs (a+λ Ss, a+λ E). This case applies if 
a+λ E < d. 
The discounted payoff obtained by E in the repeated PG when it and SS repeatedly play 
fair by (e,F;FE) is  
(b+λ E) / (1-δ )  ,  with 0<δ <1. 
The discounted payoff obtained by E if it adopts the strategy described in case A is  
(b+λ E) + (a+λ E) δ  / (1-δ ) 
Given that a+λ E < b+λ E, it follows that  
[(b+λ E)/(1-δ ) ] − [(b+λ E) + (a+λ E) δ  / (1-δ )] > 0 
Hence, E prefers to play (FE,CEj) instead of adopting the strategy described in case A. 
With regard to case B, the discounted payoff obtained by E is  
(b+λ E) + dδ + (a+λ E) δ
2 / (1-δ ). 
Also in this case, given the assumption b+λ E >d, it follows that  
[(b+λ E) / (1-δ ) ] − [(b+λ E) +  dδ   + (a+λ E) δ
2 / (1-δ )] > 0.  
We conclude that, if E and SS start to play (e,F;FE), and if they reason as if SS were 
endowed with high environmental cognitive social capital, and if E announces CSR 
principles that allow for the formation of reciprocal beliefs and conformist  preferences 
(section 4), there are no incentives for E to stop playing FE. This is true independently 
of the value of the discount factor δ .
17  
                                                 
17 In respect to the sub-game perfection of the ‘fair equilibrium’ in the PG, an alternative argument may 
be based on the demonstration (section 3) that (if λ  is high enough as we assume in this case) SS’s threat   75 
Since E does not have incentives to defect in the PG, the decision to deviate can only 
be the consequence of the strategy adopted in the PDEj played by the firm E with its 
weak stakeholders. This could be possible, and we will verify whether it is the case that 
E decides to defect in the two PDEj in which it is involved with weak stakeholders, even 
though it knows that this decision terminates cooperation also in the repeated PG.
18 For 
this  reason,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  the  incentives  that  characterize  E  in  the 
repeated  PDEj w i t h  w e a k  s t a k e h o l d e r s .  T h e  s ta g e - g a m e  n o r m a l  f o r m  o f  t h e  P D Ej i s  
shown in Figure 15.  
Figure 15 The normal form PDEj  stage game involving E and SWj 
             C SWj,E                   D SWj,E 
CE,SWj  b, b  0, c 
DE,SWj  c, 0  a, a 
            w h e r e   c >b>a>0. 
 
The assumption is that, in repeated PDEj, player E’s myopic value of  δ  does not 
make repeated cooperation sufficiently desirable for it. In other words, at any time t, the 
firm prefers to defect when the weak stakeholders play CSWjE instead of continuing to 
cooperate, even though after the defection, the payoff that E obtains from the period t+1 
onwards is equal to aδ
t-1/(1−δ ). The deviation of E at the first stage represents the first 
opportunity for it to obtain the maximum advantage by defecting when SWj plays CSWjE. 
In fact, given δ  so that  ESwj g  < 0, it follows that 
[b / (1−δ )] < … < [b + bδ  +...+ bδ  
t + cδ
t+1 + aδ  
t+2 /(1−δ )] < [b + cδ  + aδ
2 
/(1−δ )]  < [c + aδ  /(1−δ )] 
According to this payoff structure, if we consider only the PDEj, material incentives 
induce E to defect at the first stage in PDEj
 because at this first stage the incentive for E 
to defect (i.e the difference  ESwj g    < 0) is the greatest. The payoff which E obtains by 
defecting at the first stage is  
[c + aδ  /(1−δ ) ] 
                                                                                                                                               
of punishing the enterprise if it defects is a credible threat (see on this point Geanakoplos, Pearce and 
Stacchetti 1989). 
18 According to our definition, E prefers to defect with weak stakeholders in PDs instead of cooperating 
with them.   76 
and  
ESwj g  = [b / (1−δ )] − [c + aδ  /(1−δ ) ] < 0. 
However, in order to explain E’s behaviour, we must consider that E’s decision to 
defect at the first stage in PDEj implies the sanction by SS in the subsequent repeated PG 
games. In particular, according to the previous considerations, SS will play ¬e in the PG 
the stage after E has defected in PDEj. By anticipating SS’s intention, E will stop playing 
FE in the PG as well. For this reason, in order to understand the optimality of player E’s 
strategy, we should simultaneously consider the payoff structure in the repeated PDEj 
and PG.  
In particular, if  
 ∈RE j Ej g  =  ESs g  − ( 1 ESw g   +  2 ESw g  ) ≥ 0  
then we can demonstrate that if E, SS and SWj start their relationship in a fair-cooperative 
way, there are no incentives for the firm to defect.  
Consider the numerical example introduced in Figure 6  ( se c tio n  3 . 4 )  a n d  f ix  th e  
following parameters b =2 , d =4 , a =1 , c=3, λ =3 and δ E = 0.41 . When E defects at 
the first stage in the PDEj and at the second stage in the PG, we obtain:  ESs g  = 0.695, 
ESwj g  = − 0.305 and  ESs g  − 2( ESwj g ) = 0.085. This result holds independently of the stage 
when the firm may decide to defect.  
For example, if E defects at the third stage in PDEj (and consequently, at the fourth 
stage in PG, the outcome is (¬e,UE)), we obtain  ESs g  = 0.107,  ESwj g  = − 0.053 and  ESs g   
−  2( ESwj g' ) = 0.001. For this reason, given these values of parameters and δ  = 0.41, the 
sub-network of E’s cooperative relations is sustainable when players implement their 
MG trigger strategies. It is finally important to identify for which values of δ  this result 
holds and E consequently prefers playing fairly and cooperatively in the repeated PG 
and PDEi respectively, instead of defecting.  
First of all note that, when SS and E are endowed by cognitive social capital (i.e. λ E 
and λ Ss are both > d − b and only λ Ss > c − a), the repeated-Fair FE strategy in the PG 
is more profitable than the repeated-unfair UE one independently of δ . In fact, every 
strategy of deviation induces the PG-stage-game equilibrium (¬e;UE) and generates the 
repeated  PG  payoff    (a  +λ  E )δ
t-1/(1-δ ).  This  payoff  is  strictly  lower  than  the 
psychological  payoff  of  the  repeated  Fair  strategies  (consistent  with  playing  the   77 
modified MG trigger strategies defined in the  preceding  sections)  inducing  the  PG-
stage-game equilibrium (e,F;FE) and the repeated PG payoff (b +λ  E)  δ
t-1 / (1-δ ). 
Thus, E will always cooperate in the PG.  
Nevertheless,  Fair  play  in  the  repeated  PG  becomes  less  and  less  profitable  in 
comparison with defection when  δ  decreases while defection in PDEj becomes more 
and more profitable when δ  decreases. For this reason, there will be a value δ * which 
indicates the lowest value of player’ E personal discount factor δ E in correspondence to 
which  it  is  still  convenient  for  E  to  play  fairly  and  cooperate  (i.e.  the  stage-game 
strategy (FE,CEj) ), while when  δ E is lower than δ * E has incentives to defect in all 
three adjacent games. Thus, when δ E < δ *, E will defect in both the repeated PG and 
the two subsequent PDEj and the cooperative equilibrium will not be sustainable.  
Using the previous numerical parameters (b =2 , d =4 , a =1 , c=3, λ =3), we obtain 
δ * equal to 0.4. In fact when δ E = 0.4, given the other values of parameters, it holds 
that  ESs g*  − 2( ESwj g* ) = 0. For any value δ E < δ * we have that the fair-cooperative 
repeated equilibrium fails. For example, if δ E = 0.39,  ESs g  = 0.6394,  ESw g  = - 0.3607, 
and  ESs g   −  2( ESwj g )= - 0.082. 
The critical value δ * can be calculated in general as a function of the parameters b, 
d, a, c, and λ E of player E’s payoff function when it compares the fair-cooperative 
iterated payoff and the payoff from the best deviation strategy. The relevant gains are 
respectively  ESs g  =  [(b+λ E)/(1-δ )]  − [ ( b +λ E)  +  (a+λ E)  δ /(1-δ )] a s  f a r  a s  t h e  
repeated PG is concerned, and  ESwj g  = [b / (1−δ )] − [c + aδ  /(1−δ ) ] in relation to the 
repeated PDEj 
Note that the gain  ESs g  can be simplified by (b – a)  δ  /(1−δ ), which, given the 
game’s PG parameters, is in general a positive gain. Moreover, the gain  ESwj g  can be 
simplified by (b – c) + (b – a) δ  /(1−δ ),which due to the negative value of (b-c) and 
the assumptions of the other parameters in this game is in general a negative gain. Thus 
in  order  to  find  δ *,  it  must  be  established  (recall  that  the  negative  gain  from 
cooperation are doubled given that E plays two PDWj) that  
          (b – a) δ * /(1−δ *) = - 2[(b-c)+ (b-a) δ * /(1−δ *)] 
and that, given the negative value of the difference (b – c) entails 
(b – c) = - 1/2 [(b – a) δ */(1−δ *)] – (b – a) δ */(1−δ *) = 1.5[(b – a) δ */(1−δ *)]   78 
that is 
  (b – c)            
         —————  (-2/3)  =   δ * /(1−δ *) 
           (b – a)            
 
In fact, according to our parameter δ * = 0.40, which is the solution for  
(b– c) / (b – a) = –1 (as it is in our case) and for δ * /(1−δ*) = 0.666. 
 
We  may  conclude  that  the  introduction  of  psychological  payoffs  into  the  game 
played between E and SS – payoffs which stem from the agreement on the principle T (= 
CSR) of fairness in the pre-play communication phase of the game – makes the network 
among the firm and all its stakeholders sustainable, for values of player E’s discount 
factor  δ E s u c h  t h a t  δ E <   δ *,  even  though  the  firm  has  no  material  incentive  to 
cooperating with weak stakeholders.  
8  Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter has been to investigate the theoretical relationship between 
social capital and corporate social responsibility. O u r  p r in c ip a l p u r p o se h a s b e e n  to  
highlight the importance of cognitive social capital and CSR principles in generating 
cooperative networks between the firm and all its stakeholders (structural social capital).  
Cognitive  social  capital  consists  of  dispositions  and  beliefs  functional  to  the 
development of conformist motivations that affect the agents’ propensity to behave in 
different ways. Beliefs focus on reciprocal behaviours among agents and are affected by 
agreements on general principles and default reasoning stemming from agreements; but 
they  also  depend  on  the  behaviour  that  other  agents h a v e  e x h i b i t e d  i n  t h e  p a s t .  
Dispositions spring principally from the cultural environment of the most general social 
norms and values shared in society at large, so that they have a component independent 
of specific agreements on small-scale social norms and principles of behaviour, such as 
the CSR principle that a firm may agree with its stakeholders. But they also depend on 
micro elements (e.g. genetic and psychological factors) and cannot be activated without 
the other components of cognitive social capital that we have seen are related to more 
intentional  elements  like  agreements  on  CSR  norms.  Conformist  motivations  are 
reasons to act in compliance with agreed principles of justice, such as CSR principles, 
and they are proportional to the level of conformity that an agent may reach through   79 
his/her action contingently on his/her beliefs about other agents’ behaviours, and they 
also  depend  on  the  expected  reciprocity  of  other  agents  in  obtaining  high  levels  of 
conformity  contingent  on  their  own  expectations  about  other  agents.  Conformist 
motivations operate as weights that determine the extent to which the exogenous and 
primitive cooperative dispositions can affect actual behaviors.  
Structural  social  capital  is  understood  as  a  global ( m u l t i l a t e r a l )  p r o p e r t y  o f  a  
relational  network  linking    agents  (for  example  firms  and  stakeholders)  so  that, 
independently  of  the  deficiency  of  the  specific  bilateral  relations,  linkages  in  the 
network are nevertheless characterized by cooperation among agents. The sustainability 
of  such  linkages,  and  hence  the  possibility  of  observing  a  network  structurally 
characterized by social capital, depends on four factors: a) reciprocal beliefs that others 
will  cooperate,  b)  a  generic  disposition  to  cooperate,  c)  conformist  motivations 
contingent on agreed norms and beliefs, d) the existence of sanctions against agents that 
decide not to cooperate. While the first three elements are cognitive components of 
social  capital,  the  fourth  is  a  structural  characteristic  of  the  game  forms  whereby 
interaction amongst agents takes place.   
In this context, CSR is an essential part of the cognitive social capital that agents 
characterized as firms and stakeholders may possess to make cooperation in a relational 
network sustainable. In particular, CSR principles are the basis for impartial agreements 
amongst agents (firms and stakeholders) on which depend mutual beliefs concerning the 
level of principle compliance and conformist motivations (preferences) related to each 
of the solutions that agents can give to their interaction.  
In regard to the firm’s stakeholders, we have introduced a distinction between strong 
and  weak  stakeholders.  The  firm  is  interested  in  cooperating  in  the  long  term  with 
strong stakeholders, and it is not interested in doing so with weak ones.  
We have based our analytical framework on the relational network literature, and 
with particular regard to Lippert and Spagnolo (2009). But we have made an important 
innovation  to  this  framework  by  introducing  the  idea  of  modelling  at  least  some 
relations by means of psychological games. Thanks to this analytical model, we have 
been able to show that the agreement between the firms and its strong stakeholders on 
CSR fairness principles, which in their turn activate the other components of the firm’s   80 
and stakeholders’ cognitive social capital, generates endogenous incentives for the firm 
to  cooperate  with  weak  stakeholders  and  creates  cooperative  relations  that  would 
otherwise not exist.  
Our argument has consisted of the five following points: 
1.  In a context characterized by strong dispositions to conform with norms of fair 
cooperation (high levels of λ ), and by the decision of the firm to agree with its 
strong  stakeholders  –  belonging  to  the  same  context –  o n  a  c o n t r a c t a r i a n  
principle  of  fair  treatment  addressed  to  whatever  stakeholder  (a  principle  of 
CSR), the effective implementation of such a social norm may stem from the 
fact  that  effective  conformist  preferences  can  be  formed  which  activate  the 
motivational force of cooperative dispositions. Thus individuals (both members 
of the organisation in a position of authority – the firm – or internal and external 
key stakeholders) will be induced by the motivational force of those dispositions 
to maintain fair and cooperative conduct also with respect to weak stakeholders. 
In other words, a CSR principle will be complied with even if there is no direct 
advantage in terms of material payoffs accruing to the powerful members of the 
organisation or to their strong stakeholders.  
2.  Dispositions do not operate in a vacuum. The agreement on a CSR principle may 
also favour the appropriate reciprocal beliefs concerning mutual conformity that 
by themselves furnish reasons to comply with the principle. The implementation 
of a CSR standard contributes to generating the belief in the firm’s stakeholders 
that the firm will share cooperative relations with them. It is only with reference 
to explicit agreements on CSR principles that stakeholders can form their beliefs 
about the type of firm to which they are related. 
3.  This is a sort of moral reputation that reinforces cooperation which is not based 
only on the pursuit of material advantages. It therefore supplements the reasons 
for combining a good reputation with more intrinsic reasons to act. 
4.  The beliefs and dispositions related to cognitive social capital induce the strong 
stakeholders to cooperate with the firm if and only if it is also cooperative with 
weak stakeholders.   81 
5.  The possibility that strong stakeholders decide not to cooperate with the firm if it 
defects  with  weak  stakeholders  is  a  reliable  threat f o r  t h e  f i r m ,  w h i c h  m a y  
decide (it depends on the payoff structure) to cooperate with weak stakeholders 
in order to avoid the sanction from strong stakeholders. 
6.  This  produces  structural  social  capital  (in  terms  of  a  sustainable  network  of 
cooperative relations involving the firm, the strong and the weak stakeholders) 
that  would  not  be  feasible  without  the  threat  of  sanction  by  the  strong 
stakeholders.  This  sanction  is  not  due  to  exogenous r e a s o n s ;  r a t h e r ,  i t  i s  
determined by endogenous incentives that we have explained by considering the 
effect of cognitive social capital on stakeholders’ behaviour.   
Our  analysis  has  shown  that  there  exists  a  Nash  equilibrium  which  implies 
cooperation between the firm and all its stakeholders, both the strong and the weak 
ones. This cooperative equilibrium is sub-game perfect and it applies, for a reasonable 
value of the firm’s discount factors δ , when the firm generates the appropriate belief in 
strong stakeholders – characterized by cognitive social capital in terms of disposition – 
by declaring a CSR standard.  
Our findings raise numerous questions and ideas for further research. 
First, they open the way to studies aimed at empirical verification of the effect of 
cognitive  social  capital  and  CSR  declaration  on  cooperative  behaviours  by  firms 
towards weak stakeholders.  
Second, by shedding light on a new important role of SC, they encourage further 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the factors and the policies which may be able to 
increase cognitive social capital in terms of disposition to cooperate, which is a key 





We report the formal representation of the function F which captures, for agents 
endowed by conformist preferences, the effects on ideal utility of beliefs in the degree   82 
of conformity with the ideal by other agents (see also Grimalda and Sacconi 2002, 2005 
Sacconi and Grimalda 2007, and Sacconi 2010c infra). We calculate the agents’ ideal 
utility for each strategy pair of player SS and the agents’ ideal utility for E’ strategies 
when it believes that SS is going to play ¬e (in this respect note that E’s ideal utility 
associated with its strategies - FE and UE - when E believes that SS is going to play F or 
U may be easily computed by symmetrically considering the ideal utility of  SS when 
his/her strategies are (e,F) and (e,U) and his/her first-order beliefs are FE or UE).  
The utility function of agents endowed with conformist preferences 
The utility function of an agent i characterized by conformist preferences is: 
Vi = U i (σ) + λ i F [T(σ)]. 
F  is  a  function,  shared  by  all  the  agents,  of  the  normative  fairness  principle  T.  In 
abstract, F could be specified in different ways in order to consider various possible 
forms of the morality-grounded motive to behave, and it determines the weight of λi in 
the  agents’  gain.  We  follow  Grimalda  and  Sacconi  (2005)  and  Sacconi  (2006)  in 
adopting  a  particular  specification  for  F b a se d o n  a n  id ea  o f e xp e c te d mu tu a lity  in  
conforming  with  a  contractarian  principle  of  justice  (T),  captured  by  the  Nash 
bargaining solution, which seems particularly coherent with the idea of an agreement 







i i n d U U U N T
1
,..., 1 ) ( ) ( ) (σ  
 
where  i d   stands  for  the  reservation  utility  that  player  i c a n  o b t a i n  w h e n  t h e  
bargaining process collapses. In the present context, we consider it appropriate to set all 
of these reservation utilities to zero.
19 To give an example related to the calculation of 
the value of T, consider the payoff matrix reported in Figures 4 and 5 (section 2.2.2), 
where the payoffs obtained by the three players – the firm, the strong and the weak 
stakeholder, i.e. the dummy player) are (2, 2, (2)) In this case, the principle T assumes 
                                                 
19 This decision should be properly justified. Some authors argue that the proper choice for the “exit 
option” would be the Nash solution of the material game played in a non-cooperative way. However, this 
choice could be criticized because a possible situation of prevarication of one party over the other in the 
status quo would generate the final “moral” solution. For this reason, other authors have proposed the 
concept of a “moralised” status quo, where some minimal form of reciprocal respect is already in place.   83 
the value T = 2 × 2 × 2 = 8. By contrast, when at least one player obtains a payoff equal 
to 0 (for example when the active players’ strategies are (e,U;UE), it is T=3 × 3 × 0). 
Now, if we consider a two-person game, it is possible to define the two indices that 
contribute to determining F as follows: 
1.  1 + i f  : the index of player’s  i conditional conformity based on the degree of 
deviation from pure conditional conformity with T, that is,  i f ( i σ ,
1
i b ):  
i f ( i σ ,
1
i b ) = 
) ( ) (
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where  ) (
1
i
MAX b T and  ) (
1
i
MIN b T  a r e  t h e  m a x i m u m  a n d  m i n i m u m  v a l u e s  t h a t  t h e  
welfare distribution function, which represents the normative principle or ideology 
T, can assume, depending on i’s action, given i’s first-order belief , 
1
i b , about the 
action that j is going to perform.  ) , (
1
i i b T σ is the actual level of T when player i 
carries out strategy  i σ  given what s/he expects from player j.  i f  varies from 0 (no 
deviation at all from the principle T) to -1 (maximal deviation). 
2.  1+ j f
~
: the index of player j’s expected  reciprocity in conformity based on the 
evaluation that player i forms about j’s deviation from  full conformity  with the 
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i b  is the first-order belief of player 1 about the action of player j. 
2
i b  is the 




MAX b T and  ) (
2
i
MIN b T are the values that the welfare function takes when player j 
respectively maximises or minimises it, given the second-order belief of player i. In 
other words,  ) (
2
i
MAX b T and  ) (
2
i
MIN b T indicate the maximum and minimum value that 
player j can contribute to the welfare function, given his/her belief about i’s action 
                                                                                                                                               
Therefore,  our  choice  (which  follows  Grimalda  and  Sacconi  (2005)  and  Sacconi  (2006))  may  be 
considered equivalent to a notion of moralisation of the status quo from which the “bargaining” starts.   84 




i b ) is the actual value that i expects the welfare 
function to take according to his/her beliefs. Also  j f
~
 varies between 0 and -1, which 
respectively indicate the maximum and minimum degree of conformity by player j 
with the ideology embodied in the welfare function T. 
Implementing these definitions, the utility function of agent i can be written as: 
)] , ( 1 )][ , (
~
1[ ) , ( ) , , (
1 2 1 1 2 1
i i i i i j i i i i i i i i b f b b f b U b b V σ λ σ σ + + + =  
Method for calculation of the agents’ ideal utility 
In this part we provide a detailed illustration of the method for calculation of the 
ideal utility component of the players’ payoffs. The reference game and the parameters 
of the material part of the utility functions are those given in Figure 4 and Figure 5 
(section 2.2.2) of the main text. The calculation complements the qualitative discussion 
conducted in section 3.3. 
First,  we  must  remember  that  the  values  of  the  agents’  conformity  indexes 
( )] , 1[
1




i i j b b f + result from the subtraction of a deviation measure 
ranging between 0 (no deviation at all from the principle) and -1 (complete deviation) 
from the unit (i.e. 1 means maximal conformity). Taking account of different possible 
belief systems (i.e. first- and second-order beliefs justifying the prediction of any given 
outcome of the game), the conformity indexes attached to how players carry out each 
state of the game may be computed. 
•  Strategy (e,F) of SS given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays FE and given the 
second-order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (e,F).  
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (e,F) is in this case: 
       T(e,F; FE) − T
MAX (FE)     T(e,F; FE) − T (e,F; FE)     
Ss f (e,F;FE) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = 0 ,   
                 T
MAX (FE) − T
MIN(FE)     T (e,F; FE) − T (e,U; FE)      
which entails a player SS index of conditional conformity  [1 +  Ss f  (e,F|FE) ]= 1  
 
Player E’s expected deviation from full conformity for strategy FE is in this case  
      T(FE; e,F) − T
MAX (e,F)     T(FE; e,F) − T (F; e,F)     
E f
~
(FE;e,F) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = 0 ,   
             T
MAX (e,F) − T
MIN(e,F)     T (F; e,F) − T (U; e,F)        85 
so the index of expected reciprocal conformity is [1 +  E f
~
 (FE; e,F) ]= 1 . Thus, in this 
case, player SS’s strategy (e,F) obtaining ideal utility is λ  (recall that the ideal utility 






i b )][1 +  i f  ( i σ ,
1
i b )]) 
•  Strategy (e,F) of SS, given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays UE and given the 
second-order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (e,F).  
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (e,F) is in this case  
               T ( e , F ;   U E) − T
MAX (UE)       T(e,F;UE) − T (¬e; UE)     
Ss f (e,F;UE)   ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = −1,  
            T
MAX (UE) − T
MIN(UE)         T (¬e; UE) − T (e,U; UE) 
which entails a player SS index of conditional conformity  [1+ Ss f  ( e ;   U E)]=0  
Player E’s expected deviation from full conformity for strategy UE is in this cases  
               T(UE; e,F) − T
MAX (e,F)  T(UE; e,F) − T (FE; e,F)     
E f
~
(UE; e,F) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = −1,  
                    T
MAX (e,F) − T
MIN(e,F)   T (FE; e,F) − T (UE; e,F) 
the  index of expected reciprocal conformity is [1 +  E f
~
 (UE; e,F)]= 0. Thus, in this 
case, the ideal utility for player SS’s strategy (e,F) is 0. 
 
•  Strategy (e,U) of SS, given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays FE and given the 
second order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (e,U). 
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (e,U) is in this case  
 
T(e,U; FE) − T
MAX (FE)   T(e,U; FE) − T (e,F; FE)     
Ss f  (e,U;FE) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯  =  ——————————   = −1,  
               T
MAX (FE) − T
MIN(FE)     T (e,F; FE) − T (e,U; FE) 
player SS’s index of conditional conformity is therefore  [1 +  Ss f  ( e , U ;   F E)]= 0 
 
Player E’s expected deviation from full conformity for strategy FE is in this case  
E f
~
 (FE;e,U) =  T(FE|e,U) − T
MAX (e,U) = 0          
which entails an index of expected reciprocal conformity  [1 +  E f
~
 (FE;e,U)]= 1 . Thus 
the ideal utility in this case for player Ss’s strategy (e,U) is 0.  
The  calculation  of  the  expected  reciprocal  conformity  index  [1+ E f
~
(FE;e,U)] 
highlights  a  distinctive  feature  of  conformity  indexes  in  games  such  as  the  one 
considered in this chapter. When the strong stakeholder SS believes that the other player 
E believes that s/he is going to play U, the maximum and the minimum value of the   86 
function T (that may be generated by whatever response of player E to the strategy U) 
coincide.  In  these  cases,  the  welfare  distribution  function,  which  represents  the 
normative principle T, always takes value 0. This means that when the second-order 
belief of player Ss is U (that is, SS believes that E believes that s/he is choosing U), s/he 
also  believes  that  E  cannot  do  any  better  by  its  choice  than  accept  that  the  weak 
stakeholder will get 0. Thus, in these cases, a player - for example E - has no role in 
affecting the implementation of the principle T.  
Note  that  if  the  maximum  and  minimum  values  of  T a r e  t h e  s a m e ,  t h e  t w o  
differences at the numerator and the denominator in the deviation index are both 0, and 
the index is indefinite (you cannot divide by 0). However, since the only value admitted 
for T at the numerator is constant (so that also the difference at numerator is 0), it does 
not  make  sense  to  normalize  the  deviation  from  conformity  in  the  interval  from  a 
maximum and a minimum value. In fact no deviation at all is allowed. Consequently, 
we will assume that in all cases like this (in particular note that the same reasoning 
applies when the second-order belief of Ss is (¬e)), the value of the expected reciprocal 
conformity index is the difference between the value of T determined by considering 
simply the absolute value of the difference between the (expected) choice F given the 
second-order belief that (e,U) is chosen (i.e T(FE; e,U)) and the maximum value that T 
can take, again given the second-order belief that (e,U) is chosen (i.e. T
MAX (e,U)) (that 
is, what would be the numerator of the fraction normally representing the expected 
deviation from full reciprocal conformity).  
•  Strategy (e,U) of SS, given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays UE and given the 
second-order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (e,U). 
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (e,U) is in this case  
T(e,U; UE) − T
MAX (UE)       T(e,U; UE) − T (¬e; UE)     
Ss f( e , U ; U E) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = —————————— = −1,  
     T
MAX (UE) − T
MIN(UE)        T (¬ ¬¬¬e; UE) − T (e,U; UE) 
 
which means that player SS’s index of conditional conformity is [1 + Ss f  ( e , U ; U E) ]= 0. 
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Player E’s expected deviation from full conformity for strategy UE in this case is similar 
to the previous case, and hence the same method of calculation applies.  
E f
~
 (UE; e,U) = T(UE; e,U) − T
MAX (e,U) = 0  
so that the index of expected reciprocal conformity is  [1 +  E f
~
 (UE; e,U)]= 1. Again, 
the ideal utility of player SS for the strategy (e,U) under these contingencies is 0 
 
•  Strategy (¬e) of SS, given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays UE and given the 
second-order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (¬e).  
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (¬ ¬¬¬e) is in this case 
T(¬e; UE) − T
MAX (UE        T(¬e; UE) − T (¬e; UE)    
Ss f( ¬e;UE) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ =  ——————————    = 0,  
               T
MAX (UE) − T
MIN(UE)       T(¬ ¬¬¬e; UE) − T (e,U; UE) 
which entails an index of conditional conformity of player SS [1 +  Ss f  ( ¬e; UE) ]= 1 
 
Player E’s expected deviation from full conformity for strategy UE in this case is similar 
to the previous case and hence the same method of calculation applies 
E f
~
 (UE; ¬e) = T(UE; ¬e) − T
MAX (¬e) = 0  
                  
which entails [1 +  E f
~
 ( UE; ¬e)]= 1. 
These two indexes of conditional and expected conformity jointly imply an ideal utility 
λ for the strategy (¬e) of player SS under this case. 
 
•  Strategy (¬e) of SS, given the first-order belief (
1
Ss b ) that E plays FE and given the 
second-order belief 
2
Ss b that E believes that SS plays (¬e). 
The deviation of player SS from full conformity for strategy (¬ ¬¬¬e)  in this case is 
 
      T(¬e; FE) − T
MAX (FE)   T(¬e; F) − T (e,F; F)                                
Ss f  (¬e;F) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ =  —————————— = − 7/8  
              T
MAX (FE) − T
MIN(FE)  T (e,F; FE) − T (e,U; FE)                
   
the index of conditional conformity of player SS in this case is [1 +  Ss f  ( ¬e |FE) ]= 1/8  
 
The expected deviation of player E from full conformity belongs to the class of cases 
(see also the discussion of the following case) that allow simple use of the absolute   88 
difference between the T value for the expected choice of player E given the second-
order belief about player SS’s choice ¬e and the maximum value of T given ¬e 
E f
~
 (FE;¬e) = T (FE; ¬e) − T
MAX (¬e) = 0       
so that the expected index of player E’s expected reciprocal conformity is    
 [1 +  E f
~
 (F E; ¬e)]= 1. Thus the two indexes jointly imply an ideal utility equal to 
1/8λ . 
 
Let us consider E’s strategies when it believes that SS is going to play ¬e.  
 
•  Strategy (FE) of E, given the first-order belief (
1
E b ) that SS plays ¬e and given the 
second-order belief 
2
E b that SS believes that E plays (FE). 
The deviation of player E from full conformity with the strategy (FE) given ¬e cannot 
be but nil since this is a case where the maximum and minimum values of T, given 
player SS’s choice ¬e, are identical. Thus 
E f  (FE;¬e) =  T(F;¬e) − T
MAX (¬e) = 0    
so the conditional conformity index of player E in this case is [1 +  E f  (FE;¬e) ]= 1. 
The strategy ¬e (and the first-order belief that Ss is going to implement that strategy) 
highlights the second distinctive feature of conformity indexes in the type of game we 
are considering. In this case the peculiarity depends on the fact that player Ss’s strategy 
¬e assigns the game the same result regardless of the other player’s behavior, since it 
amounts to simply preventing interaction from occurring by a unilateral decision to stay 
out of it. When the strong stakeholder plays ¬e, it always generates the payoffs (1,1,1). 
Thus, in this case, the firm has no role in affecting implementation of the principle T 
(the  value  that  the  welfare  distribution  function,  which  represents  the  normative 
principle T, assumes is always 1 no matter what player E’s choice is).  
In other words, given the strong stakeholder’s strategy ¬e , the firm E cannot do 
any better than accept the T value equal to 1 determined  by player SS’s choice, which is 
the only one possible, and hence also the one with null deviation from the maximum 
value T possible when player SS does ¬e. Also in this case, given that the E’s first-order 
belief about player Ss’s behavior is ¬e, as in the case discussed above, the general form 
of the conformity indexes would be indeterminate (the denominator of the fraction is 0), 
and again there can be only  one constant value of T (at the numerator) . Therefore, in 
this case too, it does not make sense to normalize the deviation from conformity with   89 
respect to the interval between maximum and minimum values of T, since no deviation 
is  allowed  at  all.  As  we  assume  in  all  the  cases  like  the  one  considered  here,  the 
deviation measure from the maximum possible value of T will be taken to be the simple 
absolute difference between the value of T determined as a consequence of player E’s 
choice (given the ¬e choice of player SS) and the maximum value of T possible under 
that choice (that is, the numerator of the fraction would typically represent the deviation 
from full conditional conformity).  
Player SS’s expected deviation from full reciprocal conformity for strategy ¬ ¬¬¬e is in 
this case an intermediate value 
       T (¬e; FE) − T
MAX (FE)     T(¬e; FE) − T (F; FE)   
Ss f
~
(¬e; FE) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯ = ——————————   = −7/8   
                         T
MAX (FE) − T
MIN(FE)   T (F; FE) − T (U; FE)        
so that the index of expected reciprocity in conformity for the strategy ¬e of player SS is  
[1 +  Ss f
~
 (¬e; FE) ]= 1/8 , which together with the aforementioned index of player E’s 
conditional conformity gives to player E’s strategy  F given ¬ ¬¬¬e  the ideal utility 1/8λ  
•  Strategy (UE) of E given the first-order belief (
1
E b ) that SS plays ¬e and given the 
second-order belief 
2
E b that SS believes that E plays (UE).  
The deviation of player E from full conformity by using strategy (UE) given that SS does 
¬e cannot be positive. Once again we have a case where, given the strategy choice of SS 
player E cannot do any better than simply observe the decision of player SS prevents the 
interaction from occurring and assigns a unique T value to the game, which, whatever 
player E’s choice may be, cannot be different from T = 1,   
  E f  (UE ; ¬e) = T(UE; ¬e) − T
MAX (¬e)= 0                     
which entails for player E a conditional conformity index    [1 +  E f  (UE; ¬e) ]= 1 
Finally,  consider  the  expected  deviation  of  player  SS f r o m  f u l l  r e c i p r o c i t y  i n  
conformity when s/he is believed to choose ¬e given UE.  
        T (¬e; UE) − T
MAX (UE)     T(¬e; UE) − T (¬e;UE)   
Ss f
~
(¬e;UE) = ⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯⊯  = —————————— = 0          
                           T
MAX (UE) − T
MIN(UE)     T (¬e; UE)− T (U; UE)        
 
the index of conditional conformity of player SS is thus [1 + Ss f
~
 (¬e;UE)]= 1. Therefore 
when player E chooses FE given SS staying out, and E predicts that SS does ¬e jointly   90 
the two indexes of conformity are fully positive and thus the ideal utility for player E is 
λ . 
This  concludes  the  calculation  of  the  ideal  utilities  of  players  E  and  SS f o r  t h e  
different states of the PG game under the hypothesis that the players have mutually 
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